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 Chairman’s Foreword 
Put simply, for Ireland, the decision of the people of the 
United Kingdom to vote to withdraw from the European 
Union is a bad thing. Despite the assertions of some 
commentators there are very few, if any, positives to be 
gained for Ireland. Minimising and managing the impact on 
Ireland of this decision will be arguably the most significant 
challenge the State has faced in its short history. 
In recognition of the potential consequences of the UK’s 
decision the Seanad established a Special Select Committee 
to consider the implications for Ireland and to suggest some 
possible solutions to identifiable problems.  In order to 
support its thinking and considerations, the Committee 
organised nine days of public hearings with former Taoisigh, former Ministers, sectoral 
experts, representative organisations, local authorities, all-Island bodies and many more.  
In issuing invitations to witnesses, we specifically asked them to focus on the most 
significant challenges that they had identified and the potential solutions that they believed 
best addressed those challenges. Any relevant precedents and the manner in which those 
potential solutions might be implemented were also asked for. We are very grateful to all of 
those who appeared before the Committee and shared their expertise. A number of 
organisations also made important written submissions.  
In looking at solutions, either presented by witnesses, contained in written submissions, or 
suggested by the Members of the Committee itself, the Committee was determined to 
remain open to all of them. There are many challenges ahead, and we need to be innovative 
when it comes to finding solutions. This Committee believes that all options should remain 
on the table, nothing should be ruled out. 
As a result of the Committee’s solutions-focused approach, this Report deliberately pays less 
attention to the background context. This is important, but the problems have been well 
documented elsewhere.  
I commend this Report to Seanad Éireann with a request that the report be debated at an 
early date. 
Finally, I would like to thank all the Committee’s Members, substitute Members and 
Secretariat for their tireless work through this period.  
 
       
Senator Neale Richmond 
Chairman 
Seanad Special Select Committee on the  Withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union 
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 1. Methodology 
Seanad Éireann established a Special Select Committee to consider the issue of the United 
Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union at the end of February 2017, recognising the 
potential consequences of the decision and in order to consider the implications for Ireland. The 
Committee was particularly asked to consider the implications under eight headings. 
The work of the Seanad Special Select Committee was greatly assisted by previously completed and 
ongoing work by several Joint Committees of the Oireachtas, which have (and are) looking in depth 
at the impact on the sectors and areas within their remits. This work allowed the Seanad Special 
Select Committee to begin its work in sectoral areas with a great deal already done and already 
learnt. In particular the Reports of the Joint Committee on Agriculture, Food and the Marine, Impact 
of the UK Referendum on Membership of the EU on the Irish Agri-Food and Fisheries Sectors 
(February 2017) and the Joint Committee on Jobs, Enterprise and Innovation The Likely Economic 
Impact of Brexit with Particular Emphasis  on Jobs and Enterprise (March 2017) were particularly 
useful. Other reports, currently underway, provided useful signposts. 
In other areas, the Seanad Special Select Committee began considering issues in advance of Joint 
Committees and in those cases, it is hoped that the Joint Committees will, in turn, be able to build on 
the Select Committee’s work.  
Joint Committees are in a position to focus on one area and look at it in great depth. In light of the 
extremely technical and complex nature of the likely impact of Brexit on existing rules and standards 
this approach has significant value. But equally important is the need to take a more integrated, 
horizontal view that can attempt to come ‘up to the balcony’ and see how the different moving parts 
are impacting upon each other and are interconnected. The Seanad Committee, in considering a 
very broad range of topics, in an extremely short period of time, wanted to see how the different 
sectors of the economy would be impacted as well as the economy as a whole. The Committee 
considered how the four freedoms of the European internal market would be impacted as well as 
specific sectoral impacts, important to Ireland. Due to the time constraints, not all issues could be 
covered in great detail. Instead, the focus is on practical issues that attempt to mitigate the worst 
impacts of the multi-faceted challenges in front of us. 
The Committee held several days of meetings that consisted of engagements in public and is grateful 
to all those who gave of their time, who prepared and worked on their areas of expertise and were 
willing to share with the Committee. Stakeholder engagements were held with a number of Former 
Taoisigh, Former Ministers for Foreign Affairs, a Former President of the European Parliament, a 
Former Speaker of the Northern Ireland Assembly, representatives of Local Authorities, academic 
experts, representative bodies and many more. While this Report attempts to bring all of that 
learning together, it is not possible to cover everything so the Committee would recommend that 
those interested read (or watch) the Opening Statements given and the background documents 
provided – all of which have been made available online. 
For time reasons, the Committee was not able to engage with all of the individuals and organisations 
it would have liked to. Many others provided written submissions. These added significantly to the 
evidence presented to the Committee. 
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The Committee was given until the end of June to make a final report to the Seanad. With such a 
tight timeframe it was extremely challenging to consider all of the issues within the Terms of 
Reference. This Report cannot be therefore considered an absolute and final opinion on all of those 
issues. But the Committee hopes that it does provide useful signposts to areas and issues which 
require early and coordinated attention in the negotiations to mitigate, as much as is possible, the 
likely impact on Ireland. 
In accordance with the Terms of Reference, the Committee will report to Seanad Éireann not later 
than the 30th June. Under Standing Order 77, the Committee requests that the Report be debated by 
Seanad Éireann thereafter. 
Stakeholders 
 
Date Stakeholders Present 
23 March 2017 - Mr Noel Waters, Secretary General, Department of Justice and Equality 
6 April 2017 Session A 
- Mr Bertie Ahern, Taoiseach 1997-2008 
Session B 
- Mr Michael Gaynor, Dundalk Chamber of Commerce 
27 April 2017 Session A 
- Mr John Bruton, Taoiseach 1994-1997 
Session B 
- Mr Dermot Ahern, Minister for Foreign Affairs 2004-2008 
Session C 
- Professor Colin Harvey, Queen’s University, Belfast 
- Mr Michael Farrell 
- Mr Liam Herrick, Executive Director, Irish Council for Civil Liberties 
4 May 2017 Session A 
- Dr Gabrial Fagan, Chief Economist, Mr Mark Cassidy, Head of Financial 
Stability, and Ms Mary-Elizabeth McMunn, Head of Risk Division, Central Bank 
of Ireland 
Session B 
- Mr Kevin Sherry, Executive Director, Ms Anne Lanigan, Brexit Manager and Mr 
Garrett Murray, Manager of Policy and Government Relations, Enterprise 
Ireland 
Session C 
- Mr Arnold Dillon, Brexit Campaign Lead  and Mr Gerard Brady, Senior 
Economist,  Ibec 
- Ms Patricia Callan, Director,  Small Firms Association 
- Mr Ciarán Fitzgerald, Agri-Food Economist, Alcohol Beverage Federation of 
Ireland 
- Mr Kevin Thompson, CEO, Insurance Ireland 
- Mr John McGrane, Director General, British-Irish Chamber of Commerce 
Session D 
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- Mr Paul McGarry SC, Chairman of the Bar of Ireland and Chairman of the 
Working Group on Brexit and Mr Patrick Leonard SC, Bar of Ireland 
11 May 2017 Session A 
- Ms Anne Graham, CEO  National Transport Authority 
- Mr Sean Kennedy, Senior Vice-President,  Airlines for America 
- Mr Barry Kenny, Manager Corporate Communications, Irish Rail  
Session B 
- Mr Eamon Gilmore, Tánaiste and Minister for Foreign Affairs 2011-2014 
18 May 2017 Session A 
- Mr Barclay Bell, President and Mr Wesley Aston, Chief Executive,  Ulster 
Farmers’ Union 
Session B 
- Professor Gerry Boyle, Director,  Teagasc 
Session C 
- Mr Shane O’Dwyer, CEO, Irish Thoroughbred Breeders Association (ITBA)  
- Ms Elizabeth Headon, Spokesperson, Alliance for Racing and Breeding 
Session D 
- Mr James Healy, President, Macra na Feirme 
- Mr Joe Healy, President, Irish Farmers’ Association 
Session E 
- Mr Paul Kelly, Director, Food Drink Ireland 
- Mr Philip Carroll, Meat Industry Ireland 
25 May 2017 Session A 
- Border Communities against Brexit - Mr Damian McGenity, Mr JJ O'Hara and 
Mr John Sheridan. 
Session B 
- Dr Duncan Morrow, Director of Community Engagement, Ulster University 
Session C 
- Ms Gina McIntyre, CEO, Special EU Programmes Body (SEUPB) 
Session D 
- Professor Christopher McCrudden, Professor of Human Rights and Equality 
Law, Queen’s University Belfast. 
1 June 2017 Session A 
- Ms Rosemary Steen, Executive Director External Affairs  and Mr Rodney Doyle, 
Executive Director Market Operation, Eirgrid 
- Mr Stephen Wheeler, Managing Director,  SSE Airtricity Ireland 
- Ms Claire Madden, Head of Legal and Regulation Gas Networks Ireland 
Session B 
- Ms Noelle O’Connell, Executive Director,  European Movement Ireland 
Session C 
- Dr Mary Murphy, Jean Monnet Chair in European Integration, Department of 
Government,  University College Cork 
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Session D 
- Professor Anthony Coughlan, Director, The National Platform EU Research 
and Information Centre 
7 June 2017 Session A 
- Mr Pat Cox, President of the European Parliament 2002-2004 
Session B 
- Mr Kevin Toland, CEO, Dublin Airport Authority  
- Mr Aidan Flynn, General Manager, Freight Transport Association of Ireland 
Session C 
- Mrs Sharon McMahon, Designated Officer and Mr Barry Fox, Director of 
Aquaculture and Shellfisheries, and Dr Patrick Boylan, Senior Biologist, Loughs 
Agency 
- Mr Brian Kavanagh, CEO, Horse Racing Ireland  
- Mr John Comer, President and Mr John Enright, General Secretary, Irish 
Creamery and Milk Suppliers Association (ICMSA) 
Session D 
- Ireland/Northern Ireland Border Corridor Local Authority Group: Cllr PJ 
O’Hanlon, Cathaoirleach, Monaghan County Council, Mr John Kelpie, Chief 
Executive, Derry City & Strabane District Council, Mrs Joan Martin, Chief 
Executive, Louth County Council, Cllr Stephen McCann, Chairman, Fermanagh 
& Omagh District Council;  
- Cllr Paul McAuliffe, Former Chair of the Economic Development, Enterprise & 
International Relations Strategic Policy Committee and Mr Greg Swift, Head of 
Enterprise and Economic Development, Dublin City Council Dublin  
Session E 
- Mr Seán Ó Coinn, CEO and Mr Shane Ó hEidhin, Director of Corporate 
Services, Foras na Gaeilge  
8 June 2017 Session A 
- Ms Bríd O’Brien, Head of Policy and Media, Irish National Organisation of the 
Unemployed (INOU)  
- Mr Liam Doran, General Secretary, Irish Nurses and Midwives Organisation 
(INMO) 
 Session B 
- Professor Mark Ferguson, Director General, Science Foundation Ireland Chief 
Scientific Adviser to the Government of Ireland 
- Mr Tom Molloy, Director of Public Affairs and Communication for Trinity 
College Dublin (TCD) 
Session C 
- Dr John D. Woods, Chair and Mr Paul Laffin, BMA EU Policy Manager British 
Medical Association Northern Ireland Council 
- Dr Ann Hogan, President, Irish Medical Organisation (IMO) and Professor 
Trevor Duffy, Chair of the IMO International Affairs Committee 
Session D 
- Mr Niall Gibbons, CEO and Mr Shane Clark, Director of Corporate Service and 
Policy, Tourism Ireland 
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Session E 
- Mr David Garrahy, Head of Policy and Advocacy, European Youth Forum 
- Ms Patricia King, General Secretary and Mr Peter Rigney, Industrial Officer, 
Congress (ICTU) 
- Ms Anne McHugh, Chief Executive, Donegal ETB and Mr Michael Moriarty, 
General Secretary, Education and Training Boards Ireland (ETBI) 
22 June 2017 Lord Alderdice, Speaker of the Northern Ireland Assembly 1998-2004 
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 2. Implications for the Irish Economy 
Background 
Even before the referendum result in June of last year, the implications on the Irish economy were 
discussed and debated at great length. In November 2015, the ESRI suggested that the overall 
impact was likely to be focused on the trade relationship.1 This same report identified four key areas 
in which the implications were likely to be at their most significant; Trade, Foreign Direct 
Investment, Energy and Migration. Professor Alan Barrett, Director of the ESRI, highlighted these 
areas further in his address to the Dáil Symposium on European Union Affairs on 22 September 
2016, adding that the UK’s withdrawal from the EU may also have an impact on the EU’s centre of 
gravity and overall economic policy potentially shifting to more protectionist positions advocated by 
France and Germany.2 
Based on 2015 data, the United Kingdom represents 13.79% of the total GDP of the EU and is thus its 
third largest economy.3 On a wider scale, the UK was the fifth largest economy in the OECD at a 
value of 5.19% of the OECD’s total GDP, with the three largest economies in the EU only surpassed 
by the United States and Japan. Ireland’s economy is, by comparison, valued at 1.61% of the Total 
EU GDP and 0.61% of the OECD’s.4 The table below shows the position of the United Kingdom 
relative to other selected EU economies. 
 
    Source: OECD 
This highlights the importance of the UK as a known ally. Accordingly, the identification and 
development of new alliances is now of critical importance to Ireland as the UK leaves. 
                                                          
1
 Barrett et al, Scoping the Possible Economic Implications of Brexit on Ireland, Economic Social and Research 
Institute, November 2015 at p.60 
2
 The potential impacts are explored further in the ESRI Report, Scoping the Possible Economic Implications of 
Brexit on Ireland, November 2015. See also Prof Alan Barrett, ESRI, Dáil Symposium on European Union Affairs, 
22 September 2016 
3
 OECD, Domestic product 2015, measured in US Dollars. 
4
 However, Ireland has the second largest GDP per capita in the EU. 
19.87% 
8.17% 
13.91% 13.79% 
1.61% 
11.47% 
4.25% 
21.75% 
5.17% 
DEU ESP FRA GBR IRL ITA NLD Rest of
EU
POL
Share of Total EU GDP - 2015 
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Hard Brexit versus Soft Brexit 
The Committee set out to examine the implications on the economy in the contexts of a “hard 
Brexit” and a “soft Brexit”. What these terms actually mean and the impact of the UK’s withdrawal is 
the subject of much debate. The UK’s withdrawal could have an impact of up to 3.5% of Ireland’s 
GDP, which the Committee heard could amount to €9 billion. At previous events, Members of the 
Oireachtas heard that a drop of one to three percentage points could be worth €7 billion to the Irish 
economy, with the economic models used for forecasting generally underestimating.5 
Hardest Brexit 
- The withdrawal of the UK from the EU without any agreement on withdrawal, the future 
EU-UK relationship or trade; 
- No membership of the European Single Market or Customs Union; 
- No agreement on citizens’ rights; and 
- The forfeiture of commitments made to the current Multiannual Financial Framework 
(the EU Budget) and other programmes and projects.  
The hardest Brexit of all would be the UK leaving the EU without any formal agreements, with such a 
result generally accepted as having a potentially adverse impact on Ireland. The absence of a trade 
agreement would mean the application of WTO (World Trade Organisation) rules, which the 
Committee was told could lead to tariffs of up to 50% on some products. This would most likely 
involve the application of customs posts and border checks on goods in and out of the UK. Still 
extremely difficult would be the UK leaving, with a formal agreement that stipulated withdrawal 
from membership of the Single Market and the Customs Union. 
A hard Brexit seems to involve the establishment of a hard border and the application of tariffs in 
such a way as to adversely impact particular sectors and cross-border trade. It may not necessarily 
be one involving an impact on the CTA (Common Travel Area), which applies to travel and social 
rights of UK and Irish citizens. Therefore, maintaining the CTA will not mitigate the impact of a hard 
Brexit in terms of trade as the CTA only concerns the movement of people and not of goods. 
Soft Brexit 
Even if there is an agreement on citizens’ rights and the financial commitments of the UK to current 
EU programmes, the removal of trade and economic barriers through a comprehensive trade 
agreement is still very important. While this should be balanced, ambitious and far-reaching, it 
should not amount to access to the Single Market and should take a sector-by-sector approach and 
to include a transition period of a number of years.6  
Softest Brexit 
- An agreement on withdrawal and the future relationship with minimal impacts on the 
Common Travel Area and trade flows. 
- The UK retaining membership of the Single Market 
- The UK remaining as a Member of the Customs Union 
                                                          
5
 Prof Alan Ahearne, NUI Galway, Dáil Symposium on European Union Affairs, 22 September 2016 
6
 Bertie Ahern, Former Taoiseach, Evidence to the Committee, 6 April 2017 
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- The British Government maintaining contributions to the EU Budget 
- Allowing a compromise on freedom of movement and safeguarding acquired rights 
A number of models for a soft Brexit have been described by experts, policy makers and the media: 
Possible Models for a Soft Brexit 
1. ‘Norwegian model’ – This involves EEA (European Economic Area) membership, 
membership of the Single Market, allowing freedom of movement and maintaining 
contributions to the EU Budget. It also involves the application of EU rules and laws 
2. ‘Turkish model’ – This involves membership of the Customs Union and applying a 
common external tariff except for certain goods. 
3. ‘Swiss model’ – This involves the negotiation of a number of agreements depending on 
which areas of cooperation the UK wants to keep, noting that this approach has been 
discontinued between the EU and Switzerland. 
4. ‘Canadian model’ – This approach involves the conclusion of a comprehensive trade 
agreement similar to the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) 
between Canada and the EU. 
EEA membership allows for access to the Single Market, with the acceptance of the principles of 
freedom of movement of persons is clearly problematic for the UK as control of movement of people 
was a key issue in the UK referendum. To bear in mind, the EEA model does not cover agricultural 
products. EEA members are obliged to apply the acquis communautaire; that is the body of 
European legislation, case law and common policies, such as transport, competition and company 
law.7 This model excludes agriculture and fisheries, but there is a commitment to the liberalisation of 
agricultural trade subject to separate agreements.  
Membership of the EU Customs Union, i.e. the ‘Turkish model’, may also offer a solution, but again, 
this does not apply to agricultural products, services and public procurement.8. While the EU has 
indicated a preference for a framework agreement, some elements of the Swiss model could be 
adapted to ensure a sector-by-sector approach including agriculture.9 
Under the ‘Canadian model’, CETA eliminates nearly all tariffs between Canada and the EU, with 
restrictions on some food items. as CETA does not cover the “passporting” of financial services and, 
if a mixed agreement, any agreement would have to be ratified by all Member States as per their 
own requirements.10 
A soft Brexit is currently considered unlikely by some as control on immigration is thought to be a 
red line issue for the UK. The Conservative-led Government has indicated a wish to negotiate trade 
agreements with third countries, which could mean full withdrawal from the Single Market and the 
                                                          
7
 http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/norway/, accessed 16 June 2017 
8
 http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/turkey/, accessed 16 June 2017 
9
 The European Economic Area (EEA), Switzerland and the North, European Parliament, available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ftu/pdf/en/FTU_6.5.3.pdf, accessed 16 June 2017, p.4 
10
 Under Article 13.7.6 of the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, the provision of cross-border 
services is permitted, but there is no requirement for a state party to allow the provision of that service in its 
territory. 
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Customs Union.11 Without a new free trade agreement in place between the EU and the UK then 
trade between the UK and the EU would be subject to WTO rules. Under this, the UK could not offer 
a 0% tariff to the EU without offering it to other third countries. 
But negotiations could last 2 years, positions can change as the practical implications emerge and 
the results of the UK General Election on 8 June may result in a greater potential for a softer Brexit, 
or at least the UK remaining a member of the EU Customs Union. 
Visible and Potential Impacts on Business 
Currency fluctuations have impacted some sectors more than others. In the immediate aftermath of 
the election result, the Pound Sterling plummeted in value, falling from €1.30 on 23 June 2016 to 
just under €1.20 on 24 June. Currently, the value of Sterling is in the region of €1.15 to €1.20, falling 
to as low as €1.1068 in October 2016.12 This had a significant impact on those sectors relying on 
fixed costs for the sale of goods to the United Kingdom, particularly businesses in the agri-food 
sector. 
The Committee heard of the many services available to businesses in Ireland to prepare for Brexit. 
Enterprise Ireland (EI) and the Small Firms Association focused particularly on this point. Concerns 
were raised about the number of businesses that are not EI clients and may not have prepared in 
any way yet. The Committee heard that a number of firms have no Brexit contingency plans in place 
and the Committee recommends that all Brexit tools and resources formulated by state agencies be 
rolled out to all small and medium enterprises registered in Ireland and a communications campaign 
be undertaken. 
The Committee has concerns regarding the economic impacts on Irish businesses and heard a 
number of possible effects, including: 
- UK-Ireland trade could decline by as much as 20%; 
- As many as 40,000 jobs could be lost; 
- The decline in Irish GDP could be as much as 3.5% in subsequent years; 
- WTO tariffs could have the greatest impact on food and agri-business and have the effect of 
increasing the cost to consumers. The Committee heard that the cumulative value of trade 
in the food and drink sector between Ireland and the UK is valued at as much as €12 billion; 
- The number of visitors from the UK to Ireland has declined by 4% in 2017, which is 
equivalent to approximately 141,000 visitors (this is possibly linked to currency fluctuation). 
Central to economic concerns were serious worries over the establishment of a hard customs border 
between Ireland and Northern Ireland, which the Committee heard, has the potential for major 
economic and logistical disruption. This could result in Irish food companies moving operations to 
the UK simply to avoid tariffs and make their supply chains work. 
The Committee heard that there is a potential negative impact on the tourism sector, as well as the 
retail and hospitality sectors. The current decline in tourism numbers is already further impacted by 
                                                          
11
 One of the key requirements of the Customs Union is agreement to apply a common external tariff. 
12
 European Central Bank, 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/policy_and_exchange_rates/euro_reference_exchange_rates/html/eurofxr
ef-graph-gbp.en.html  
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visitors reducing their length of stay, spending less, changing accommodation type and reconsidering 
travel options following the referendum result. In retail, the Committee heard some Irish-based 
retailers are already substituting cheaper imports from the UK for Irish products and that campaigns 
to encourage the purchase of Irish goods will be critically important.13 
The imposition of customs posts and duties is likely to affect some sectors more than others. As 
stated above, the agri-food sector is a key concern. This is particularly in light of the possibility that 
the UK will conclude trade agreements with third countries that could undercut Irish products in 
terms of price and in standards. It has been suggested that if a customs regime cannot be avoided, it 
would be extremely difficult to protect Irish exports of agricultural products.14 As a solution, a free 
trade agreement between the EU and the UK for vulnerable sectors, including agricultural products, 
should be a primary consideration. 
Revenue and Customs 
While the Committee was unable to cover the area of customs in depth it does note the engagement 
of the Joint Committee on Finance, Public Expenditure and Reform, and Taoiseach (JCFPERT) on the 
issue on 25 May 2017.  
Following the withdrawal of the UK from the EU, including from the Customs Union, the UK will be 
considered a third country for customs purposes, requiring a number of additional procedures for 
any export and import of goods.  The customs process involves the completion of an import or 
export declaration, which must be lodged either by a clearance agent employed by the business, or 
by the business itself if it has authorisation.15 
While the JCFPERT heard that planning is very important to make the process operate smoothly, 
there are a number of challenges and changes to the current practices, including:16 
- A requirement to lodge customs declarations on all imports from and exports to the UK; 
- Declarations lodged must be correct to ensure compliance, minimise risk of delays and avoid 
additional charges; 
- Streamlining customs processes, particularly for areas such as the agri-food sector; 
- Building cash flow considerations into any future business model; and 
- Customs tariffs will depend on whether a free trade agreement is concluded. 
Customs is a competence of the EU under the Treaties and is governed by the Union Customs 
Code17, and any tailored approaches for EU-UK trade would need to be negotiated between the EU 
and the UK.  
                                                          
13
 Patricia Callan, Small Firms Association, Evidence to the Committee, 4 May 2017. 
14
 The Elements of a New EU-UK Relationship, John Temple Lang, 12 June 2016, IIEA at p.5. The concern relates 
to the possibility the UK will pursue cheap food imports from countries such as Brazil, Argentina, Australia and 
New Zealand. 
15
 Ms Carol Lynch, BDO, Joint Committee on Finance, Public Expenditure and Reform and Taoiseach, 25 May 
2017,  
16
 Ibid. 
17
 Regulation (EU) No 952/2013, which entered into force on 30 October 2013, although most substantive 
provisions entered into force on 1 May 2016. 
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The volume of trade is one of the most significant challenges. At the hearing of the JCFPERT, the 
Chairman of the Office of the Revenue Commissioners, Mr Niall Cody, stated that 1 million roll-on 
roll-off units arrive at our ports each year, over 90% of them from the United Kingdom and that 1 
million HGVs and 1.3 million LGVs move in each direction between Ireland and Northern Ireland 
annually.18 
Many small companies in Ireland whose only export activity is to Northern Ireland or other parts of 
the UK will be unfamiliar with any of these procedures and will have to learn how to interact with 
complicated customs procedures for the first time. 
As noted in Chapter 8, significant infrastructural challenges arise concerning the management of 
trade and possible reorientation of transit routes towards the continent post-Brexit. This could 
involve catering for a higher number of services. 
 Potential Solutions
Trade 
- The establishment of a Common Trading Area on the island of Ireland as part of a future 
EU/UK Agreement. 
- That Ireland does not sign up to any EU/UK transitional agreement post-Brexit that does not 
include a lengthy period of phasing in any new customs and tariff arrangements on the 
Island of Ireland that may occur. 
- The conclusion of a far reaching, comprehensive trade deal, with minimal trade barriers. 
Foreign Direct Investment 
- Ensuring that the Central Bank of Ireland is competitive with other EU and Eurozone Central 
Banks in assisting regulated institutions seeking to locate in Ireland with well-resourced 
support and information on Ireland’s financial regulatory regime. The Committee also 
recommend that the Central Bank of Ireland consider how, without jeopardising its 
independent regulatory function, it could assist the IDA in their role of attracting foreign 
direct investment into Ireland arising from Brexit. 
- The provision of further capital projects, including in the areas of transport, education and 
housing, in order to equip Ireland to compete for new opportunities resulting from and after 
Brexit. 
State Aid / Fiscal Solutions 
- Ireland should seek to work with other affected EU partners to negotiate an enlargement of 
the General Block Exemption Regulations in the area of state aid to assist those sectors likely 
to be most adversely affected by Brexit due to both proximity and trade reliance. In certain 
sectors, this could include a large state aid exemption regime of the form undertaken during 
the 2008 Financial Crisis. 
- A derogation from fiscal rule requirements could also be explored to allow for the required 
capital expenditure on adapting and expanding infrastructure, housing and support services. 
- The utilisation of funding from the European Investment Bank to alleviate the need for 
additional fiscal space for capital projects. 
 
                                                          
18
 Mr Niall Cody, Office of the Revenue Commissioners, Joint Committee on Finance, Public Expenditure and 
Reform, and Taoiseach, 25 May 2017 
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Financial Services 
- The Committee recommends that the Department of Finance commission an independent 
review on the opportunities and disadvantages of the UK losing its passporting rights within 
the Single Financial Markets with particular focus on the potential impact and opportunity 
for professional services in Ireland. This review should form the basis for a renewing and 
amending the “Strategy for Ireland’s International Financial Services sector 2015-2020.” 
- It is essential that Ireland supports a lengthy transitioning period post-Brexit for the UK’s 
potential loss of passporting and access to the Financial Single Market. 
Supports for Businesses 
- Campaign to increase awareness of services that state agencies provide to all businesses. 
- The supports and tools provided by state agencies should continue to be rolled out to all 
businesses and efforts should be made to make all relevant businesses aware of supports. 
- There is a need for an aid package for businesses already impacted by Brexit, particularly 
those businesses with low profit margins impacted by currency fluctuations. 
- Funding to allow exporters who are not EI clients to prepare a Brexit plan should be 
explored. 
Transit and Movement of Goods 
- A pre-clearance model for goods may function as part of a solution, whereby trucks and 
drivers can pass through the UK land-bridge without incurring duties or checks. 
- A system of pre-registering loads online and tracking using GPS or number plate recognition 
is a possible solution for trade with Britain and Northern Ireland. 
- Anti-abuse measures need to be put in place, including mobile spot-checks of goods.  
Strategy 
- The Department of the Taoiseach Interdepartmental Brexit group should include officials 
from the Central Bank of Ireland, as was the case during the Financial Crisis when similar 
interdepartmental groups existed. 
- The interdepartmental group needs to be sufficiently resourced so that it can shadow the UK 
Government’s Department of Exiting the European Union in ensuring that Ireland take the 
challenges and opportunities posed by Brexit as seriously as our nearest and most important 
trading partner. 
- The interdepartmental group should work more closely with a wider consultative group of 
stakeholders’ right across the industry and society sectors concerned about Brexit. 
- This group should be mandated to publish a post-Brexit Ireland White Paper before the end 
of 2017, so that citizens, businesses and future investors in Ireland would see precisely how 
it intends to manage its economy no matter what the outcome of the EU/Brexit 
negotiations.”. 
Continued EU Membership 
Although considered unlikely, the UK could revoke its notification to withdraw from the EU. The 
Committee heard from Former Taoiseach, Mr John Bruton, that Article 6.8 of the Vienna Convention 
should be considered and that the EU negotiating team should keep the door open for the United 
Kingdom to change its mind.19 The Committee heard that the UK public may see merit in this as it 
could demonstrate differences or potentially provide an alternative to any final agreement.. 
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Trade 
The Committee heard that the risks and uncertainties associated with Brexit highlight the 
importance of stability-orientated policies, most notably in the area of public finances and financial 
system stability. 
Given the cultural and economic connectedness of the UK and Ireland, the importance of a free 
trade agreement was highlighted and the Committee heard that a free trade agreement with 
minimal trade barriers is the goal and that competition must underpin any new relationship.20 The 
Committee also heard that arrangements between the EU and the UK that accommodate either no 
tariffs, a minimal number or a low level of tariffs would mitigate the negative impact. 
A number of possible solutions were discussed during hearings and in documents considered by the 
Committee. These include the establishment of a Common Trading Area, a slower introduction of 
tariffs along the border and a phasing-in arrangement of the final agreement between the UK and 
Ireland. Expanding trade links with other EU and non-EU countries was also put forward as a means 
of mitigating the impact of Brexit. 
Following the United Kingdom’s withdrawal, a transitional arrangement could apply, in order to 
allow the EU and UK economies to adjust to the agreement. The Committee heard that a different 
phasing-in or differentiated transitional arrangement could apply to Ireland, i.e. phasing-in at a 
slower rate. 
Foreign Direct Investment 
In September 2016, Members of the Oireachtas heard of the benefits of Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI) to Ireland, with the following figures highlighted:21 
- FDI contributes €130 billion in exports from Ireland; 
- FDI also contributes €9 billion in payroll per annum in Ireland; 
- The majority of corporation tax comes from FDI; 
- Multinationals directly employ 187,000 people; and 
- With the multiplier effect, at least 318,000 jobs are dependent on FDI. 
FDI has increased in recent years with some 19,000 jobs created in 2015. 
It seems that infrastructure in Ireland is a key concern for UK-based companies considering 
relocation. The Committee heard that there is a need for public investment to be significantly 
increased in transport, education and housing if demand from relocating companies is to be met. 
On the issue of investment, the Government has indicated preparations for a ten-year capital plan. 
At his speech to the Institute of International and European Affairs, then Taoiseach Enda Kenny TD 
highlighted this, stating that the Government is: 
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“already in active discussions with the European Investment Bank, which recently 
opened an office here in Dublin. I am confident those discussions will lead to significant 
further EIB investments in Ireland.”22 
In the same speech, the then Taoiseach highlighted the need for investment in roads, public 
transport, energy, water, schools, higher education, hospitals and health services. Reference was 
also made to Ireland’s ports and airports.23 The Committee believes that availing of funding through 
the European Investment Bank may alleviate the need for additional fiscal space to support capital 
projects. 
State Aid and Fiscal Rules 
In the event that further infrastructure and supports are needed, it may be necessary for the 
Government to explore ways in which businesses may be supported. The Government has outlined a 
number of measures in its 2017 Budget document.24 However, these measures must conform to 
existing state aid rules. In addition to state aids, infrastructural projects, such as transportation and 
educational supports, may require additional derogations from EU fiscal rules. This issue, in the 
context of housing, is detailed further in the Report of the Dáil Committee on Housing and 
Homelessness in June 2016.25 
A separate arrangement for Ireland on the application of State Aid rules following the United 
Kingdom’s withdrawal could serve to aid those companies that are most affected.26 The Committee 
heard that the state aid rules are built upon the good functioning of the Single Market, but it was 
noted by the Committee that Brexit represents a fracture in the Single Market and that an element 
of additional expenditure may be required to help Ireland adapt.27 For example, this may include tax 
breaks to companies involved in capital expenditure or providing additional supports to those whose 
operations have been disrupted by Brexit such as training and new market advice. 
With Ireland recognised as the Member State likely to be most affected by Brexit, the potential 
effects should be explored with a view to making a case for a temporary derogation from state aid 
rules. Similarly, a temporary derogation from the Stability Support Mechanism, as the withdrawal of 
the UK and its impact on Ireland is an exceptional circumstance, could serve to provide additional 
capital and current expenditure, particularly for infrastructural projects such as adapting ports and 
providing serviced land for housing. However, this would impact on the amount of borrowing the 
State would need to make. 
Financial Services 
The Committee heard that a key impact of Brexit is that providers of financial services into and out 
of the UK could lose what are known as “passporting” rights. This essentially means that a provider 
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of financial services licensed in one Member State can, under certain conditions, provide those 
services in all EU Member States.28 
The Committee heard that in the financial services sector, the Central Bank maintains a supervisory 
and regulatory role.29 The promotion of Ireland (as a possible alternative to the UK) is within the 
remit of IDA Ireland. The Committee believes that an element of coordination and involvement from 
the regulator and IDA Ireland could assist in ensuring that Ireland is in the best possible position to 
attract FDI in the area of financial services. 
In the area of insurance, the Committee heard of the need for Irish companies to access the UK 
market in a similar manner to the agri-food sector. Insurance Ireland suggested an approach based 
on approval in principle, referred to as grandfathering, which is based on the good standing of a 
regulatory authority.30 Grandfathering, or regulatory  grandfathering, is a mechanism that recognises 
a business’ record in a comparable regulatory jurisdiction, and the approval process that would have 
applied to that business in that jurisdiction. The Committee heard that a joint grandfathering 
arrangement between the UK and Ireland could facilitate a regulatory corridor that would allow for 
rapid approval of Irish entities seeking to export their services to the UK. 
Supports and Expenditure 
The Committee heard that businesses should prepare for a hard-Brexit but also heard that while 
companies are alerted to the challenges posed by Brexit, not all of them have taken action and some 
witnesses expressed worry that many businesses have not prepared at all. The need for companies 
to put resources into markets outside the UK has been highlighted previously and that point was 
made again.31 
The Committee heard that toolkits and advice notes have been prepared for businesses to help with 
preparations for Brexit. A scorecard has been produced by Enterprise Ireland and the Committee 
encourages businesses to avail of this in order to aid their own understanding of the level of 
preparations required.32 The Committee also heard that funding was made available to Enterprise 
Ireland clients to prepare Brexit plans and that providing similar funding to businesses not 
represented by EI should be explored. The Committee heard that companies should now move to 
Brexit-proofing their business. 
The impact of Brexit is differentiated by sector. Some sectors rely almost exclusively on trade with 
the United Kingdom, most notably the agri-food sector. For others, it is a minor part of their 
businesses. The Committee heard that aid packages to assist businesses in adjusting to Brexit should 
be considered and the Committee believes this should be explored.33 
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Competitiveness 
A number of witnesses underlined the importance of making Ireland more competitive. This does 
not just relate to access to the EU markets, language, education and so forth, but also to cost 
competitiveness, the ability to enforce a contract and the ability to obtain construction permits.  
The Committee heard that initial reforms could be focused on the cost of doing business in Ireland.34 
Taxation and regulation were identified as matters of national competence. The Committee heard 
that any measures introduced should not result in additional increases to the cost of doing business 
and the Government should also examine current legislation to reduce business costs. The 
Committee heard that one example that could be explored is Ireland’s excise duties, which are 
among the highest in the EU.35 
Transit and Movement of Goods 
While a number of possible options in the context of Free Movement of Goods between the UK and 
Ireland are considered below, a number of practical arrangements for border controls and transit 
were also put forward. The ideal would be the UK remaining within the Customs Union and the full 
preservation of the CTA. A comprehensive free trade agreement that eliminates most, if not all, 
tariffs and customs could minimise damage. However, the Committee also heard some solutions for 
supporting customs controls if they need to be imposed, including36: 
- A pre-clearance model for goods travelling as through-traffic via the UK land-bridge; 
- A pre-registration system for loads; 
- Mobile spot checking for the origin of goods; and  
- The use of number-plate recognition and GPS tracking of vehicles all offer possible solutions. 
On 25 May 2017, the Joint Committee on Finance, Public Expenditure and Reform, and Taoiseach 
heard that Revenue is “looking at the latest technology to provide us with a system that can clear 
goods in seconds and facilitate their free flow”,37 
Strategy 
The Committee heard a proposal from one of the business representative groups, (Mr John McGrane 
from the British Irish Chamber of Commerce) that there may be merit in forming a tight, well-
resourced collective of business representation.38 The Committee believes that an expanded joined-
up approach that involves the relevant stakeholders has merit and suggests that the relevant 
Departments will know how best to engage. 
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Trade Solutions specific to Northern Ireland 
Earlier in this chapter, the consequence of a hard versus soft Brexit is discussed for all EU-UK Trade 
and the Single Market. The following scenarios, which are specific to Northern Ireland, could 
mitigate the impact of Brexit for trade between Ireland and Northern Ireland. 
Summary and Potential Solutions - Trade 
EEA+ Model 
- This option involves Northern Ireland joining the EEA, with additional agreements covering 
areas not covered by the EEA Agreement, e.g. agriculture. This has been discussed in detail 
by the European Policy Centre. 
Common Trading Area 
- This could take the form of a formal trading area that is put in place between the United 
Kingdom and Ireland, but if a free trade agreement is put in place between the EU and the 
UK this may not be necessary.  
An Enhanced Role for the British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference 
- The Committee believes an enhanced role for British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference (in 
considering and identifying regulatory changes that could create barriers to trade between 
Ireland and the UK) could be developed. This could focus on barriers to trade not related to 
tariffs and customs and strengthen the East-West component of the Good Friday 
Agreement. 
German Model – Protocol allowing all-island trade 
- This solution is based on a trade arrangement between East and West Germany before its 
reunification in 1990 and referenced in the Treaty of Rome. Under the ‘German model’ trade 
on the island of Ireland would be considered as all-island trade and within the one economy. 
This would correspond to the all-island economy currently in place across a number of 
sectors but how this would comply with subsequent treaties to the Treaty of Rome will need 
to be further explored. 
Solution 1: EEA+ Model 
The Committee considered a number of examples concerning the free movement of goods. In 
relation to Northern Ireland, the Committee heard that there is some potential in the EEA+ model.39 
This is an enhanced version of EEA membership for Northern Ireland only, with additional 
agreements to cover integral sectors such as agriculture and fisheries, which is not already 
comprehended by the EEA acquis.40 
In his appearance before the Committee, Professor Christopher McCrudden suggested that the EEA 
agreement is a good base upon which to build the remaining agreements considered necessary. The 
Committee believes this arrangement has potential, particularly during any transition period, if not 
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feasible in the longer-term. This arrangement functioning as a transitional arrangement was also 
suggested by Lord Alderdice in his appearance before the Committee.41 
A disadvantage to this option is that Northern Ireland would have to make a choice on where border 
checks would take place and whether they would be east-west checks (i.e. undertaken when 
crossing the Irish Sea) or north-south checks (i.e. undertaken when crossing the land border). The 
Committee heard that a digital border may be difficult to enforce unless it is in the Irish Sea.42  
Solution 2: Common Trading Area 
Former Taoiseach, Mr Bertie Ahern suggested a Common Trading Area for the UK and Ireland. While 
a Common Trading Area may result in a customs control being avoided between Ireland and 
Northern Ireland (North-South) or Ireland and the UK (East-West), it is important that a full analysis 
is carried out on both sides of the border, in order to determine if this is mutually advantageous. In 
keeping with the principles underpinning the Single Market, this could be confined to closed 
markets, where the production, manufacture and consumption occur entirely on the island of 
Ireland. 
A common arrangement for goods where the UK and Ireland operate under different rules than the 
rest of the European Union was presented as a possible solution. While this may be more difficult to 
agree and enforce, this arrangement could be restricted to goods that are not re-traded to the rest 
of the European Union and vice-versa. The Committee heard that this scenario is unlikely to be 
favoured by the other Member States. Additionally, if a free trade agreement is put in place, this 
approach may not be necessary. 
Solution 3: Trade Role for the British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference 
The British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference (BIIC) may have a function in addressing non-tariff 
barriers and identifying possible issues in regulatory divergence between Ireland and the UK that 
may impact UK-Irish trade. 
The Committee heard that the BIIC could meet monthly to consider the possible impacts of 
proposed changes to UK or Irish law. This would allow an opportunity to respond to possible changes 
to standards, for example, that could adversely impact trade between Ireland, Northern Ireland and 
the rest of the United Kingdom. In cases of national competence, issues could be developed and 
solved by the UK, devolved administrations and the Irish Government. In areas of EU competence, 
Ireland could recommend that the EU consider the issues. The Committee heard that such a role 
would also strengthen the East-West elements of the Good Friday Agreement. 
Solution 4: Protocol to the EU Treaties allowing All-Island Trade  (German Precedent) 
A precedent set by West Germany43 and East Germany prior to reunification was explored by the 
Committee. Following the agreement of the Treaty of Rome in 1957, the then West German 
government negotiated a protocol to this Treaty which treated trade between East and West 
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Germany as ‘internal’ trade.44 This status remained in place following the establishment of the 
European Customs Union and the Basic Treaty between East and West Germany in 1972.45 However, 
following reunification, the need for the protocol was obsolete as all German territories were 
subject to the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany. 
The Committee considers this precedent to be a potential solution for Northern Ireland following the 
United Kingdom’s withdrawal. Such a designation could be adapted to make reference to Northern 
Ireland as the territory not subject to Bunreacht na hÉireann, being the equivalent document to the 
Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany. The Committee also notes that this arrangement was 
in place before the creation of the Single Market, which dismantled many barriers to EU trade and 
put in place a significant number of harmonising, health and safety and other rules and before the 
creation of the Customs Union.  It would therefore be necessary to explore in some detail how 
elements of this proposal could operate and be viable with these new structures in place. The 
Committee believes that elements of this approach could be adopted in any solution that safeguards 
all-island trade and believes that this should be explored. 
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 3. The Common Travel Area 
Background 
Since the establishment of the Irish Free State in 1922, both the Irish and British governments have 
operated what is known as the Common Travel Area (CTA). Its origins can be traced in the mutual 
recognition of each other’s immigration laws, which were largely based on pre-independence 
immigration policy.  The CTA has no connection to trade or customs duties, instead focusing on 
travel to/from and the right to reside in each other’s jurisdiction. 
The CTA allows for British and Irish citizens to the right to enter and remain in each other’s country, 
without the need for a visa, residence permit or proof of resources. Many of the original CTA rights 
were superseded by European rights of free movement of persons. Following the UK’s withdrawal 
from the EU, the right of entry and residence may be restricted for nationals of EU Member States. 
In the case of Ireland, the right of entry and to remain deriving from the Ireland Act 1949 and 
Immigration Act 1971 (United Kingdom) and the Aliens Act 1935 (Ireland) would still be in place. The 
Committee heard that the CTA can be described as a “mini-Schengen” area. It should be noted 
however, that technically the CTA does not confer a right to work.46 The CTA is based on reciprocity, 
meaning the UK and Irish governments do not treat each other’s citizens as foreigners. 
The Committee notes that the Joint Committee on the Implementation of the Good Friday 
Agreement is also considering this issue. The CTA has been identified by the Government as one of 
its four key negotiating priorities and the Committee heard from numerous stakeholders on the 
potential impacts. In its Brexit, Ireland’s Priorities publication, the Government outlined the 
following key statistics which highlight the importance of the CTA. It further emphasises the focus on 
air and sea routes between the two islands. 
The CTA and the Movement of People in numbers47 
- There are 87 air routes, operated by 8 airlines, between Ireland and Great Britain. 
- There are 9 passenger ferry routes in operation between Ireland and Great Britain. 
- There are 841 flights from Dublin Airport to Great Britain per week. 
- The Dublin-London air route is the busiest in Europe and second busiest in the world, with 
368 flights per week during the 2016/2017 winter schedule. 
- 41% of tourists to Ireland came from Britain and 32% of trips to the UK in 2015 came from 
Ireland. 
- In 2011, the Central Statistics Office (CSO) found that in the region of 14,500 people 
crossed the border to work every day, with most of those crossing the border into 
Northern Ireland.48 
- 1,852,000 cars cross the land border with Northern Ireland every month 
- There are almost 300 crossings on the border with Northern Ireland 
By contrast, many Members of the European Union, along with Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein and 
Switzerland, operate the Schengen Area, a free travel zone and common external border operated 
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under the terms of the Schengen Agreement of 1986. The Schengen Area, in a similar way to the 
CTA, allows passport-free travel and common visa requirements. In his opening remarks to the 
Committee on 23 March 2017, Mr Noel Waters, Secretary General of the Department of Justice and 
Equality stated that: 
“Of the 27.9 million passenger journeys through Dublin Airport in 2016, 9.9 million were from 
the UK to Ireland or from Ireland to the UK, which is 36% of the total. Averaged out over the 
year, it means 27,000 passengers have their journey facilitated by the common travel area 
every day. In 2015, 1.2 million residents of Northern Ireland used Dublin Airport, which 
averaged almost 25,000 people per week crossing the Border to catch flights, and 1 million 
visitors to Northern Ireland came into this State via Dublin Airport. All of these journeys, and 
the economic activity generated, are made possible by the common travel area arrangements 
so much so that it is taken for granted in facilitating movement of people North-South and 
east-west. The picture at other entry points to the State is the same. Cork Airport has over a 
dozen routes to the UK, with almost 1 million passengers, or 50% of the total, in 2016 taking a 
journey in either direction. The number of passenger journeys by sea through our ferry ports is 
also significant at approximately 2.8 million per year. It is estimated there are an average of 2.2 
million monthly vehicular crossings on the North-South land Border.” 
Free Movement of Persons 
Neither the United Kingdom nor Ireland is a member of the Schengen Area, choosing instead to 
operate outside the Schengen acquis. While passports are not required to travel within the CTA for 
Irish and UK nationals, some airlines require proof of identification when flying between the UK and 
Ireland. This is reflective of their own individual policies and not a legal requirement. 
The exact provisions of special travel arrangements under EU law for the UK and Ireland are set out 
in Protocol 20 to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Article 2 of this Protocol 
makes explicit reference to the CTA, setting out a requirement to fully respect the rights of persons 
as set out in Union law. Ireland participates in some European Schengen measures, such as the 
Schengen Information System, and requirements on visas etc are mirrored in Irish law and 
regulations to ensure cohesion with other Member States. 
Following the UK’s withdrawal, EU rules will no longer apply between both jurisdictions. One of the 
key issues raised was whether the position of Irish nationals in the UK (and vice versa) would be in 
any way limited. The Committee heard that this may create numerous issues in the area of civil 
justice, which could give rise to uncertainty for the conduct of commerce between the EU and the 
UK in addition to free movement of workers. The Committee also heard of the possible impact of the 
UK withdrawing from the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice. 
Visa and Immigration Policies 
Since its origins, a central feature of the CTA is the coordination of visa and immigration policies. 
Ireland has broadly mirrored British requirements on immigration, for example enacting the Aliens 
(Amendment) Order 1962 to account for changes in the UK regarding the status of immigrants from 
Commonwealth countries.49 More recently, the UK and Ireland have cooperated on some common 
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short-stay visa arrangements which allows visitors from participating countries to apply for one visa 
and be able to visit both countries. 
Between 1939 and 1952, the CTA was suspended. This suspension mostly arose from a divergence in 
Irish and UK immigration policy, with parliamentary records in the UK from the time suggesting that 
the CTA would only resume if both countries resumed the pre-war arrangement to coordinate 
policies. During this period, a border control was operated at the Irish Sea. In 1950, the House of 
Commons was told that there were “17 or 18 Customs posts” and that controlling the Border 
effectively would require “an army of immigration officers”.50 
In recent years, “Operation Gull” is believed to have operated to address the alleged use of the CTA 
to circumvent relaxed immigration controls between Ireland and the UK.51 This involved the 
operation of enhanced immigration checks conducted at air and sea ports on individuals travelling 
between Ireland and the UK. 
Under the Aliens (Amendment) Order 1975, it is also possible for Irish immigration officials to 
prevent a non-UK or non-Irish national from entering Ireland if there is an intention to travel to 
Northern Ireland or the United Kingdom.52 After Brexit it is not clear if this could or would have to be 
applied to EU Member State nationals not from Ireland. 
Land Border 
There is a concern that any changes or alterations to the present CTA arrangements could: 
 Have a significant impact on the daily cross-border movements in border regions; 
 Destabilise the peace process; and 
 Impact North-South relations.  
Both the British and Irish Governments have reiterated a desire to maintain the CTA and not return 
to the “borders of the past”. As the CTA mirrors the Schengen Area in a lot of ways, there is the 
suggestion both could co-exist insofar as travel is concerned. 
The main effects of the CTA between both jurisdictions are that they: 
- Maintain an open border between their territories; 
- Allow free movement and related rights to each other’s citizens; and 
- Co-ordinate their immigration policies in relation to other countries. 
According to the CSO, there is a clear inter-dependence between Ireland and Northern Ireland, and 
to a wider extent, Ireland and the UK in terms of migration and working in each jurisdiction. These 
figures are outside travel conducted for other purposes such as business, tourism and connecting 
travel. Additionally, there is a slightly higher number of daily commuters travelling from Ireland to 
Northern Ireland and annual migrants travelling from Ireland to the United Kingdom, as the 
diagrams below illustrate. 
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Source: CSO 
The Government has set out its position as securing “acknowledgment from EU partners and 
institutions that the long-standing bilateral CTA arrangements with the UK will be maintained (in 
conformity with EU law)”. In addition to this position, the Government has identified specific 
implications for Northern Ireland, the movement of people and access to services. These 
arrangements are particularly important in the context of the Good Friday Agreement. 
A key aspect of CTA provisions is that Irish citizens are not treated as foreigners under British law. 
The Government’s document also notes the CTA’s role in providing access for the citizens of Ireland 
and the United Kingdom to each other’s social welfare benefits, housing supports, healthcare and 
education.53 They also retain certain voting rights. Many of these benefits are implicit and not 
defined by any express agreement or instrument, but rather derive from the treatment of Irish and 
British citizens under British law and the common law that survived independence. 
During hearings, the CTA was described as a “mini-Schengen” area by officials from the Department 
of Justice and Equality, and it was further highlighted that a border control exists between the CTA 
and the Schengen Area through passport checks. This position is also stated in the Government’s 
Brexit Priorities. 
In its Negotiating Strategy, the Government has noted the following: 
“The status of Irish citizens in the UK is provided for in the Ireland Act 1949 which states that 
Ireland “is not a foreign country for the purposes of any law in force in any part of the United 
Kingdom”. The status of Irish nationals was maintained under the Immigration Act 1971 and the 
British Nationality Act 1981. The Irish Government made an order (Citizens of the United 
Kingdom and Colonies (Irish Citizenship Rights) Order 1949, which provides that UK citizens enjoy 
in Ireland similar rights and privileges to those enjoyed by Irish citizens in the UK.” 
The operation of the CTA is also vital to Ireland’s relationship with Northern Ireland. In the business 
context, the Committee heard that many businesses in border regions are reliant on cross-border 
flows of labour, trade and customers.54 The Committee also heard that for tourism, if there is an 
impediment to freedom of movement and delays at border crossing, then visitors may be 
discouraged from travelling between both jurisdictions, while tour operators may also be 
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discouraged from including Northern Ireland and the border regions in tours.55 There is also concern 
regarding the manner in which cross-border partnerships and reconciliation may be impacted by the 
return of any symbols of division, such as customs posts, as well as the queues and delays a hard 
border may cause. Again, this issue is separately considered by the Joint Committee on the 
Implementation of the Good Friday Agreement. 
Potential Solutions 
Maintaining Border Controls between the CTA and Schengen Area 
- As neither Ireland nor the United Kingdom is part of the Schengen Area, the imposition of 
border controls with the Schengen Area could remain in place. This is the preservation of the 
status quo. 
Common Visa Scheme 
- The Committee recommends the common visa scheme, where it exists, be continued. 
Schengen Visa Model – Common Visa Schemes 
The approach in Schengen Member States is that if one Member State grants a visa to a third 
country national, that third country national can travel throughout all Schengen Member States 
within the terms of that visa. 
This is a model which is replicated in Ireland and the UK, through the British-Irish Visa Scheme and 
which currently applies to India and China. These visas generally relate to entry into a state only and 
not necessarily for work. The scheme should be protected and enhanced. The Committee heard that 
arrangements between Ireland and the UK, in effect, mirror the arrangements between members of 
the Schengen Area. It was further noted by the Department that Ireland cannot be in both the 
Schengen Area and the CTA, and that while Ireland might be interested in becoming a Member of 
Schengen, the current arrangements are to Ireland’s advantage. 
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4. Northern Ireland  
Background 
Northern Ireland and the Good Friday Agreement have been recognised in the Guidelines adopted 
by the European Council: 
“The Union has consistently supported the goal of peace and reconciliation enshrined in 
the Good Friday Agreement in all its parts, and continuing to support and protect the 
achievements, benefits and commitments of the Peace Process will remain of 
paramount importance. In view of the unique circumstances on the island of Ireland, 
flexible and imaginative solutions will be required, including with the aim of avoiding a 
hard border, while respecting the integrity of the Union legal order. In this context, the 
Union should also recognise existing bilateral agreements and arrangements between 
the United Kingdom and Ireland which are compatible with EU law.”56 
The British Prime Minister, Theresa May, has further highlighted the importance of avoiding a hard 
border, stating in her speech at Lancaster House that “[n]obody wants to return to the borders of 
the past, so we will make it a priority to deliver a practical solution as soon as we can”.57 The British 
priorities focus more on the Common Travel Area, but the importance of a seamless border and its 
impact on North-South relations has been acknowledged by many. 
The Committee believes it is important to note that in the UK’s EU Referendum, a majority of the 
people who voted in Northern Ireland, voted to remain in the EU: 55.77% of the valid votes or 440, 
707 votes to remain, out of a total of 790,149 valid votes. This represented a 62.7% turnout. 
Citizenship 
Good Friday Agreement 
In the Good Friday Agreement, both the British and Irish Governments committed to: 
- recognise the birthright of all the people of Northern Ireland to identify themselves and be 
accepted as Irish or British, or both, as they may so choose, and accordingly confirm that 
their right to hold both British and Irish citizenship is accepted by both Governments and 
would not be affected by any future change in the status of Northern Ireland.58 
- The Agreement defines the people of Northern Ireland as “all persons born in Northern 
Ireland and having, at the time of their birth, at least one parent who is a British citizen, an 
Irish citizen or is otherwise entitled to reside in Northern Ireland without any restriction on 
their period of residence”. 
Under the Good Friday Agreement, those born in Northern Ireland are entitled to British citizenship 
and / or Irish citizenship. This creates a unique situation where after the UK’s withdrawal, around 1.8 
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million residents of a third country would either hold, or be entitled to, EU citizenship. Exercising 
that right to dual citizenship in Ireland has already seen a spike in applications for Irish passports, 
resulting in the hiring of additional staff to address the increased demand. 
The Good Friday Agreement also confers the right on the people of Northern Ireland to self-
determination on the issue of reunification: 
The economic situation in Northern Ireland presents additional challenges. Northern Ireland could 
be described as a net beneficiary of EU funds in its own right. In sectors such as agriculture, 
withdrawal from the EU will mean the end of payments to farmers under the Common Agricultural 
Policy. An all-island economy has developed in certain sectors, most notably in the areas of energy 
and tourism. The withdrawal of the UK will have significant implications for developments built on 
work done on promoting all island cooperation. 
Summary and Potential Solutions – Funding and the Border 
The provisions of the Good Friday Agreement are the bedrock for peace and stability in Northern 
Ireland and the wider island. It is imperative that any agreement respects this and ensures the 
continuance of its provisions. 
The PEACE and INTERREG programmes should be retained to support the continuance of cross-
border and cross-community initiatives following Brexit. This is vital to the peace process and 
ensuring political stability in Northern Ireland. A continued financial support for the two schemes 
will have to be explored with the UK along the model that already exists for INTERREG 
programmes with third countries. 
Some witnesses and Members of the Committee suggested that no border poll under the Good 
Friday Agreement should occur until it is clear that a respectable or sizeable number of all 
communities are in favour and such a poll follows the principle of consent.  
Other witnesses and Members of the Committee were clear in their desire to ultimately see Irish 
reunification, and for the principle of consent, contained in the Good Friday Agreement, to be 
respected and that a poll be held when it is likely that ‘a majority of those voting would express a 
wish that Northern Ireland should cease to be a part of the United Kingdom and form part of a 
united Ireland’.    
Environmental legislation and mechanisms may diverge post-Brexit. To address this, effective 
mechanisms and minimum common standards should be explored, including the treatment of the 
island of Ireland as a single bio-geographic area. 
Unique Arrangements for Northern Ireland 
At the time of the Committee’s work, the Northern Ireland Assembly was not in a position to engage 
and neither were elected representatives in Westminster. This absence was disappointing. A number 
of Northern Ireland’s political parties and many others have endorsed a special status for Northern 
Ireland. Different parties have different solutions in mind when they consider how to structure such 
a unique status. 
Former Taoiseach, Mr Bertie Ahern proposed the establishment of a Common Trading Area 
(discussed in Chapter 3 concerning the Common Travel Area). While Trade is an EU competence, 
there may be a willingness to make special arrangements for Northern Ireland. 
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In his appearance before the Committee, Professor Colin Harvey of Queen’s University Belfast made 
the following observation: 
“[W]e have the habit of talking about some outlandish or suggested special status that is 
somehow odd but from a constitutional legal position with regard to Northern Ireland, what we 
are asking the guarantors
59
 to do is recognise what is supposed to be an existing special status 
already”.
60
 
The Committee believes this is a very important point. Northern Ireland already has special 
provisions which apply to it, examples of which include its unique position on citizenship (discussed 
above and in Chapter 5 concerning citizens’ rights)61 or the unique PEACE programmes established 
by the EU, which only concern Northern Ireland.  
The Committee heard that while there may be difficulty in referring to a special status in broad 
terms, if the discussions focused on practicalities, it may be possible to develop a shared 
understanding and agreement.62 The Committee also heard that a special status would not have to 
extend to every area, but to areas where it is practical, e.g. disease control and the economy. 
Border Poll and Re-joining the EU 
As has been noted by the Joint Committee on the Implementation of the Good Friday Agreement63, 
Brexit has implications for the principle of consent. 
On the issue of a border poll, the Committee heard that the UK’s withdrawal from the European 
Union should not in and of itself be a catalyst for a border poll by some witnesses, including Former 
Taoiseach, Mr Bertie Ahern who suggested: 
“The only time we should have a border poll … is when we are in a situation where the 
Nationalists and republicans and a respectable or sizeable number of Unionists and 
loyalists are in favour, and on the basis of consent.”64 
At the same time other witnesses and Members of the Committee were clear in their desire to 
ultimately see Irish reunification, and for the principle of consent, contained in the Good Friday 
Agreement, to be respected and that a poll be held when it is likely that ‘a majority of those voting 
would express a wish that Northern Ireland should cease to be a part of the United Kingdom and 
form part of a united Ireland’. Members of the Committee welcomed the declaration of the 
European Council in April 2017 on the possibility of a future united Ireland being entitled to full 
automatic EU membership. 
The Committee considered suggestions it is very important to depoliticise Brexit discussions, this 
was noted by Dr Mary Murphy: 
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“To some extent it can be unhelpful to talk consistently about the possibility of having a 
Border poll. It is very unhelpful to the process because it politicises the Brexit issue. In 
order to achieve some kind of solution to the Brexit issue, depoliticising the issue is 
imperative.”65 
Solutions predicated on the German precedent, where reunification led to automatic membership of 
the EU, may also be possible. The Committee considers it important to ensure the possibility of this 
scenario forms part of the negotiated agreement. 
In relation to all of the issues contained in the Good Friday Agreement, the Committee noted its 
importance in underpinning the Northern Irish Peace Process, and the Committee is concerned at 
suggestions contained in the recent study66 for the European Parliament’s Constitutional Affairs’ 
(AFCO) Committee suggesting that the Good Friday Agreement “will need alteration” as a result of 
the UK’s withdrawal. 
The Environment 
The Committee was told that there has been little discussion of the environment, environmental 
protection or sustainable development in the context of Brexit to date.67 As Ireland and Northern 
Ireland share a land border and that following Brexit, UK and EU regulation may fall out-of-sync, this 
may be problematic.68  
As solutions, the Committee believes the following should be explored:69 
- That the Government, Northern Ireland Executive, UK Government and EU partners work 
together to enable effective long-term management of the environment; 
- That the island of Ireland be considered a single bio-geographic unit post-Brexit; 
- That effective mechanisms are put in place to resolve and manage cross-border 
environmental issues post-Brexit; 
- That minimum common standards and approaches are sought between England, Scotland, 
Wales and Northern Ireland and in the context of Northern Ireland, those standards are 
aligned as closely as possible to Ireland; 
- That new funding arrangements should be established to replace current sources of EU 
funding. 
Central to this, the Committee considers that a mechanism should be put in place to ensure the 
environmental regulation is aligned between Ireland and Northern Ireland and that post-Brexit, 
common minimum standards are maintained. This could be reinforced by, for example, access to the 
Single Market could be dependent on adhering to environmental law standards.70 
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Special EU Programmes Body (SEUPB) and EU Funding 
The Committee heard that the current cross-border EU funding programmes are PEACE IV and 
INTERREG VA, which follow on from previous programmes completed over the last two decades. 
These programmes are critical to fostering cross-border partnerships and understanding, which are, 
in turn, key in developing the peace process. 
As outlined in the below table, the PEACE Programme has contributed a total of over €2.2 billion to 
initiatives in the border region, with over €1.5 billion of this figure coming from the EU: The PEACE 
Programme is only operated in the border region of Ireland and Northern Ireland and the Committee 
was told it was a unique solution in itself. Similarly, the INTERREG Programmes have contributed 
over €1.1 billion to projects, with €810 million contributed by the EU. 
Funding through the PEACE Programme has played an important role in addressing the trauma and 
legacy mental health issues that have remained as a result of the conflict.  These effects can be long-
standing and enduring if not adequately addressed. Representing the Special EU Programmes Body 
(SEUPB), Ms. Gina McIntyre noted that as part of the PEACE III (2007-2013) round of funding, 
thousands of people received direct support related to post-conflict recovery. This included events 
aimed at assisting victims and survivors, conflict resolution workshops, trauma counselling, and 
initiatives designed to address barriers (physical and non-physical) to fully acknowledging and 
dealing with past trauma.  
In total, 6,999 people received trauma counselling, and 189,007 people attended events focused on 
sectarianism, racism or conflict resolution.71 This highlights the importance of EU funding for cross-
border reconciliation, support and empowerment post-conflict. Given the uncertainty already 
generated by Brexit, the Committee feels that such supports must be maintained for individuals, 
families and communities once the UK leaves the EU.  
With regard to INTERREG funding across the EU, the Committee heard that there are examples of 
cases where projects are engaged in by an EU Member State and a non-EU state. Representing the 
Special EU Programmes Body (SEUPB), Ms Gina McIntyre highlighted that expenditure on the 
INTERREG Programme comprises a 60% contribution from the UK side and 40% from Ireland (as 
detailed below), with each Government’s contributions including the EU element. The Committee 
heard that the SEUPB will seek continued funding from the UK post-withdrawal from the EU. If 
models used in other programmes with non-EU Member States were to be followed the funding for 
the UK contribution would have to come entirely from UK funds, as the UK could no longer rely on 
EU funding. 
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PEACE Programme 1995 – 2020 
Programme Period EU Contribution 
(€m) 
National Contribution 
(€m) 
Total 
Contribution 
(€m) 
PEACE I 1995-1999 500 167 667 
PEACE II 2000-2004 531 304 835 
PEACE II ext 2005-2006 78 82 160 
PEACE III 2007-2013 225 108 333 
PEACE IV 2014-2020 229 41 270 
  1563 702 2265 
The Irish and Northern Irish contributions for the PEACE Programmes are summarised as follows: 
The EU and National 
Contributions for each 
PEACE programme are 
summarised as follows: 
Programme 
Period 
 
EU Contribution 
(€m) 
National 
Contribution (€m) 
Total 
Contribution 
(€m) 
PEACE I 1995-1999 500 167 667 
PEACE II 2000-2004 531 304 835 
PEACE II ext 2005-2006 78 82 160 
PEACE III 2007-2013 225 108 333 
PEACE IV 2014-2020 229 41 270 
Total  1563 702 2265 
INTERREG Programme 1991 - 2020 
Programme Period EU Contribution 
(€m) 
National 
Contribution 
(€m) 
Total Contribution 
(€m) 
INTERREG IA 1991-1993 82.1 67.9 150 
INTERREG IIA 1994-1999 159 103 262 
INTERREG IIIA 2000-2006 137 46 183 
INTERREG IVA 2007-2013 192 64 256 
INTERREG VA 2014-2020 240 43 283 
  810.1 323.9 1134 
The Irish and Northern Irish contributions for the INTERREG Programmes are summarised as follows: 
Programme EU Contribution 
(€ Million) 
National Contribution 
(€ Million) 
Total Programme Value 
(€ Million) 
 Northern 
Ireland 
Ireland Northern 
Ireland 
Ireland Northern 
Ireland 
Ireland 
INTERREG IIIA 73.98 
(54%) 
63.02 
(46%) 
21.16 
(46%) 
24.84 
(54%) 
95.16 
(52%) 
87.84 (48%) 
INTERREG IVA 123.7 
(64%) 
52.97 
(28%) 
41.23 
(64%) 
17.66 
(28%) 
164.93 
(64%) 
70.63 (28%) 
INTERREG VA 146.52 
(61%) 
71.23 
(29%) 
26.00 
(60%) 
13.00 
(30%) 
172.38 
(61%) 
83.8  
(30%) 
 
In addition to the table, INTERREG IVA included a programme with Scotland which amounts to 
€20.47 million (€15.35 million of which came from EU funding) and INTERREG VA which costs €26.58 
million (€22.59 million of which came from EU funding).  
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A more general issue highlighted to the Committee was the awareness of EU-funded programmes 
and the benefits they bring. The Committee heard that many of these projects permeate through 
the local communities. The PEACE IV Project has four core themes: 
1) shared education; 
2) children and young people; 
3) shared spaces and capital (shared across eight areas including health and victims); and 
4) building positive relations at regional level.  
INTERREG is focused on four core objectives in the research and innovation area and includes 
environmental initiatives in the areas of protected habitats, water management and sustainable 
transport. 
To date, such environmental initiatives and funding have aligned closely with the broad range of 
environmental protections and objectives established by EU legislation. Depending on the terms of 
any potential withdrawal, the possibility that the UK would no longer be bound by core EU 
environmental directives has introduced a degree of uncertainty regarding the continuity of 
environmental legislation, and therefore funding, in Northern Ireland and the border region. 
A challenge therefore will be ensuring that environmental standards in Northern Ireland are 
maintained post-Brexit. To this end, the Committee welcomes the commitment from the British 
Prime Minister, Theresa May, that the UK intends to remain a “leading actor” on environmental 
policy and climate change and ensure that current EU environmental regulations are included in EU 
law after withdrawal.72  
This is particularly important given the strong cross-border dimension to environmental issues, 
which by nature transcend boundaries. There is a big overlap on issues such as biodiversity loss, 
climate change and air and water quality and this requires a coordinated, consistent approach across 
the island of Ireland. Again, EU funding has played an important role in this regard. If an 
arrangement is put in place where the UK remains within the Single Market and maintains a 
contribution to the EU Budget, then arguably, the present funding arrangements could remain in 
place. However, in the event of a hard Brexit, the question of future EU funding needs to form a key 
part of the negotiation process. 
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5. Citizenship and Social Rights  
Following the referendum result on 24 June 2016 and the notification of the United Kingdom to 
leave the European Union on 29 March 2017, there is significant concern regarding the rights of EU 
citizens resident in the UK, as well as the rights of UK citizens living in other EU Member States. 
According to the negotiating directives issued by the General Affairs Council of the EU, the 
negotiations should be focused on: 
“safeguarding the status and rights of the EU27 citizens and their families in the United Kingdom 
and of the citizens of the United Kingdom and their families in the EU27 Member States is the 
first priority for the negotiations because of the number of people directly affected and of the 
seriousness of the consequences of the withdrawal for them. The Agreement should provide the 
necessary effective, enforceable, non-discriminatory and comprehensive guarantees for those 
citizens' rights, including the right to acquire permanent residence after a continuous period of 
five years of legal residence and the rights attached to it”. 
This is reflective of the key concern of Member States with regard to the UK decision to leave, i.e. 
the rights of their citizens living in the UK post-Brexit. The negotiating directives have already 
indicated that the rights of EU citizens, along with the financial obligations of the UK in light of 
Brexit, are to be negotiated as the first priority. 
The European Parliament has highlighted the rights of EU citizens, including the need for reciprocity 
and non-discrimination. Unique provisions pertaining to Northern Ireland are also a consideration 
and have already been discussed in Chapter 4. 
EU Law on Citizenship 
The supremacy of EU Law, coupled with the obligation in the Constitution to enact provisions which 
are necessitated by EU membership, mean that the rights of citizens are applied to citizens of all EU 
Member States, but are qualified as described above. There are similar, though differently defined 
rights to enter and reside in other EU Member States. The basis of these rights is set out as follows: 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
- Nationals of EU Member States hold EU citizenship as well as their national citizenship. 
- Citizens are conferred with “the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the 
Member States” (Article 21 TFEU). 
As an EU Member State, Ireland is obliged to adhere to the provisions of the EU Treaties. In addition 
to the EU Treaties.  Directive 2004/38, which is more widely known as the Citizens’ Rights Directive, 
was enacted in 2004. This sets out the common rules for the movement of EU citizens between EU 
Member States. Under the Directive, EU citizens are defined as “any person having the nationality of 
a Member State”.73 
Directive 2004/38 (The Citizens’ Rights Directive) 
EU citizens and the members of their families, defined under Article 2(2) of the Directive, are 
conferred with the right to: 
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- reside in any other Member State for up to three months subject only to holding valid 
identification such as a passport (Article 6); 
- reside for longer periods if they are workers, self-employed or otherwise capable of 
supporting themselves and their families without relying on the host state’s social assistance 
systems, or are registered students with appropriate financial resources and health 
insurance (Article 7); 
- automatically acquire permanent residence in a host state after residing in it continuously 
for five years (Article 16). 
Irish Law on Citizenship 
The basis of the rules governing Irish citizenship lies in Articles 2 and 9 of Bunreacht na hÉireann. 
While the right to Irish citizenship has been further elaborated on and clarified by the Irish 
Naturalisation and Citizenship Acts 1956 to 2004, Irish citizenship can be described as a diluted form 
of jus soli, i.e. citizenship by birthright, allowing citizenship to those born of at least one Irish or 
British parent, or a parent who is legally resident in the State. 
Irish citizenship may also be acquired through a policy of naturalisation. There are circumstances 
where the Minister for Justice and Equality may allow a person to be naturalised if they have 
demonstrated Irish descent or Irish associations, have been resident abroad in the Irish public 
service or have been granted refugee status or declared to be stateless. 
Northern Ireland 
Of direct concern to Ireland on the issue of citizenship is how it will pertain to Northern Ireland. The 
rights of Irish citizens in the rest of the UK would be broadly the same as citizens from the other 
Member States, notwithstanding any additional rights that arise through bilateral arrangements with 
the UK through the CTA (discussed in Chapter 3), as well as unique provisions on Citizenship 
pertaining to Northern Ireland (discussed in Chapter 4). However, issues concerning human rights 
protections arise from the withdrawal of the UK from the Charter of Fundamental Rights as part of 
the Brexit process, along with the potential of any changes to its membership and application of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in the future. 
Potential Solutions 
- The equivalence of human rights protections in both Ireland and Northern Ireland, as 
provided for in the Good Friday Agreement, should be protected. 
- An all-island approach to human rights should be explored, with possible solutions 
including a reimagined role for the Joint Committee on Human Rights and a Charter of 
Rights for the island of Ireland. Additionally, the Bill of Rights project in Northern Ireland 
should also be revisited. 
- The Government should support all arrangements which allow for the free movement of 
EU citizens, either from Ireland or other EU27 states. 
- In the event the right to permanent residence does not form part of the final withdrawal 
agreement for EU citizens, Ireland could adopt an approach of allowing residence in 
Northern Ireland to be reckonable for the purposes of naturalisation as an Irish citizen. 
- In the context of social rights, the EU should promote the social pillar as a key facet of its 
work, and a Social Semester should be explored. 
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Human Rights and Equality 
Presently, the UK, like all other EU Member States, is subject to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the EU. Through the Human Rights Act 1998, it is also subject to the ECHR. During hearings, the 
Committee heard of a possible long-term objective in the UK to replace the Human Rights Act 1998 
with a UK Bill of Rights. A key concern is that this Bill of Rights may not be as far-reaching, with the 
protections it offers being somewhat diluted. 
In the context of Northern Ireland, the Good Friday Agreement provides for the equivalence of 
human rights protections in Ireland as in Northern Ireland, which the Committee heard was aimed at 
requiring Ireland to incorporate the ECHR into Irish law. As Ireland is an EU Member State, it will 
continue to be bound by the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which is interpreted by the European 
Court of Justice, as well as the ECHR, to which Ireland and the EU are both parties. The Committee 
heard that Ireland should argue for the retention of current human rights protections, which would 
mean that Northern Ireland continues to be bound by the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the 
jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice and that the ECHR, through the Human Rights Act also 
continues to apply. The Committee notes that the ECHR, as opposed to the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights is expressly provided for in the Good Friday Agreement. 
The Committee also heard of the possibility of all-island approach. This could take a number of 
forms, but the approach suggested was a reimagined role for the Joint Committee on Human Rights, 
which could have oversight on human rights on the island of Ireland.74 This could extend as far as the 
Committee having an independent chair and being tasked with providing an annual statement on 
human rights and equality. Another approach suggested is for a separate Charter of Rights for the 
island of Ireland, which the Committee heard was previously considered. This could be linked to the 
work of the Fundamental Rights Agency at EU level, which the Committee heard would ensure that 
the people of Northern Ireland are not left out of the conversation of where the EU is going. 
Permanent Residence and Naturalisation 
While the provisions of the Good Friday Agreement allow persons born to a British or Irish parent, or 
a parent permanently resident in Northern Ireland, to become Irish citizens, the Committee heard 
that residence in Northern Ireland was not reckonable for persons who wished to become 
naturalised citizens of Ireland, and that this led to situations where there are children who are 
entitled to become Irish, and thus EU citizens, but their parent or parents are not. 
As noted above, the Citizens’ Rights Directive provides that EU nationals have a right of residence 
after five years, and maintaining the right to permanent residence is stated as an objective in the 
negotiating directives. Depending on the final agreement, this right could be affected by the UK’s 
withdrawal. 
It was suggested to the Committee that allowing periods of residence in Northern Ireland to be 
reckonable for the purposes of naturalisation in Ireland would allow those in Northern Ireland who 
are anxious about their status post-Brexit the option of applying for Irish citizenship.75 The 
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Committee heard that this could be achieved by changing Irish legislation and the Committee also 
observes that this may be a possible solution for EU citizens in Northern Ireland should their 
positions be affected  post-Brexit. 
Social Rights 
As part of his 2016 State of the Union address, the President of the European Commission, Mr Jean-
Claude Juncker, proposed a Pillar of Social Rights. The subsequent documents from the European 
Commission set out a number of key principles and rights to support fair and well-functioning labour 
markets and welfare systems.76 
The Committee heard from the General Secretary of the Irish Congress of Trade Unions, Ms Patricia 
King, that its position on social rights in the EU context is clear. It is an EU that is “vital to the living 
standards, wages, public services and labour rights of workers and their families across the island”.77 
However, the need for the EU to change was also highlighted, as was the growing dissatisfaction 
with its policy direction in recent years. While the Future of the EU is discussed further in Chapter 7, 
the Committee believes the issue of social rights, while linked to the issue of citizens’ rights, is 
important for continuing the benefits of EU membership and that Ireland should focus on the Pillar 
of Social Rights as it develops. 
The Committee heard that despite directives in areas such as equality that enhanced the rights of 
citizens, during the last 10 years new legislation was more focused on the impact on citizens during 
the recent financial crisis. This was particularly highlighted in the context of citizens of debtor 
countries within the EU which endured periods of austerity in order to solve economic and financial 
problems and the Committee heard that now, as a result, the European Union operating as an 
economic entity without any reference to citizens is no longer an option.78 
Related to Brexit, two key issues were identified: 
1) Increased costs from tariffs post-Brexit could result in pressure from companies to reduce 
terms and conditions of employment or face closure. 
2) Companies may relocate entirely to the UK in order to avoid tariffs and customs.  
A response suggested to the Committee involves a more robust civil dialogue between the Irish and 
UK Governments and the Northern Irish Executive, as well as at civil society level. The Committee 
heard that this could be enabled by adapting existing mechanisms established under the Good 
Friday Agreement. 
During its engagement on social rights, the Committee heard of the differences that already exist 
between the UK and Ireland in relation to employment legislation: 
“ We have spoken with the TUC in the UK, including its branches in Scotland and Wales. They hear 
and feel our pain but they are already suffering. They would like to have some of the employment 
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rights legislation we have, such as that relating to joint labour committees, even if all sectors do not 
involve themselves in it. They would like to have sectoral employment orders. We have far worse 
collective bargaining legislation here. Trade unions have no rights here; there is a right to join a 
union but it ends there.”79  
A possible objective for the EU27 is a Social Semester, which would be similar to the European 
Semester.80 This process would involve the annual assessment of Member States’ progress initially 
by the European Commission, and then considered by the Council of the European Union, with the 
aim of suggesting recommendations for improvement. It was suggested that the EU’s social 
principles should be enunciated as much as economic principles, the EU project promoted 
accordingly. The Committee believes such a model may serve to enhance the enthusiasm in Member 
States for the EU project. 
In addition, the Committee heard that the EU has recommended that Ireland enhances social 
infrastructure, including social housing and quality childcare.81 A possible solution, particularly in the 
context of any negative economic consequences from Brexit, is for job activation programmes to act 
as a real stepping stone. This should include further training and educational supports if required.82 
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 6. Agriculture 
Issues related to agriculture, farming and the food sector have already been thoroughly considered 
by the Joint Committee on Agriculture, Food and the Marine in their February 2017 Report ‘Impact 
of the UK Referendum on Membership of the European Union on the Irish Agri-Food and Fisheries 
Sectors’. But in order to consider any more recent thoughts and to consider the linkages with other 
policy areas, the Committee held a number of Sessions related to Agriculture. 
The importance of agriculture and agri-food businesses to Ireland is well-known and as well as the 
sector’s significant importance to the rural economy. It is clear that “Ireland is the EU economy that 
will be the most impacted by Brexit, and farming and agri-food will be the most impacted sector83”.  
The UK is an important buyer of much of Irish agricultural produce, both fresh and processed. 
Overall 40% of Irish agri-food exports go to the UK: 50% of Irish beef, 33% of dairy products, 50 % of 
pigmeat products and 90% of mushrooms84. 
For the UK, Ireland is an important supplier of food and the Committee heard that Ireland85: 
- supplies 26.25% of the beef and veal consumed in the UK (nine times as much beef is sent to 
the UK from Ireland as to any other individual country);  
- is largest supplier of sheep meat into the UK; and  
- is an important supplier of dairy products. 
Discussions around Brexit have brought into sharp focus the level and depth of the integration of 
the supply chains of many agricultural products, especially in border regions with products in 
different stages of development going across the border in both directions to be processed, 
packaged or further developed. Often the same product travels over the border and back before 
finally being sold.  
Because of the importance of the sector to Ireland and the interconnectedness of the markets, the 
Committee heard, quite starkly that “Brexit could represent one of the largest competitiveness 
shocks that the Irish agri-food industry has faced86”. The challenges for the agri-food and farming 
sector were identified as:  
- the potential loss of access to the UK market for Irish products without facing very high tariff 
rates; 
- ongoing currency volatility; 
- massive disruption to the all-island supply chains; 
- potential customs difficulties using the UK as a land-bridge to access other EU markets; 
- potential future differences in standards or product rules (like packaging and labelling for 
example); 
- knock-on impacts on farms and farming incomes; and  
- a potential impact on CAP funding.  
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The Committee explored with a number of the stakeholders the impact of potential tariff barriers 
(should there not be a Free Trade Agreement with the UK), as the tariff rates that would apply under 
WTO Rules for the various food products are amongst the highest tariffs possible and were 
described to the Committee as “prohibitive and at plausible measures of the responsiveness of trade 
to prices (what economists call price elasticities) [to] destroy this trade flow”87.  
The Committee heard of the particular concerns of the thoroughbred and horse-racing industries. 
Both industries are well-developed, highly successful and strongly interconnected, acting in many 
ways like single industries88, with no replacement market possible for the British market. 
Many of the potential solutions put forward by stakeholders, were clearly developed to mitigate the 
potential impact of Brexit changes and to maintain the status quo or the closest possible 
relationship. More than any other sector that the Committee heard about, the impact on agriculture 
will depend on the nature of the final negotiated agreement and in particular whether the UK 
remains within the Customs Union and if a Free Trade Agreement (which includes agricultural 
products) is agreed between the EU and the UK. 
 Potential Solutions
Customs Union/Single Market  
- The Government should advocate strongly for the UK to re-consider its original position 
and consider remaining a member of the Single Market and/or Customs Union. 
- Should the UK leave the Single Market and/or Customs Union, exploration of ways in 
which Northern Ireland could remain in the Customs Union completely, or solely for 
agricultural products is required. 
Free Trade Agreement 
- Ireland should advocate for the EU to conclude a Free Trade Agreement between the EU 
and the UK, which includes an agricultural chapter in advance of the UK’s withdrawal. In 
the event that this is possible because of lack of time, transitional periods should be 
supported. 
- The Agreement should address the conditions and standards under which the UK imports 
food products from outside of the EU that do not meet similar high health and safety 
standards. 
Transitional Arrangements 
- Consideration should be given to transitional arrangements. Negotiations to develop Free 
Trade Agreements are often long, detailed processes that cannot be rushed.  
State Aids 
- Relaxation of state aids on farming and agri-food industry is required. 
Legislative Equivalence 
- Efforts should be made to ensure that legislative equivalence is secured.  
Competitiveness 
- Efforts to address cost competitiveness should be continued 
Market Supports 
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- In the event of important (Euro- Sterling) currency fluctuation, direct market supports 
should be considered. 
- Employment subsidy schemes and enterprise stabilisation measures should be re-
introduced. 
Support for Innovation, Market Diversification and increased capacity 
- The Government should consider increasing supports for the development of new 
products, addition of new attributes to existing products, and increasing knowledge 
transfer.  
- Companies should continue to be assisted and supported in entering new markets as well 
as increasing their share of existing markets. 
- Consideration given to increasing the budget of Bord Bia and other relevant bodies to 
support companies.  
- The Irish Government should continue to review and improve supports aimed at increasing 
the capacity, efficiency and productivity of the sector. 
EU Budget 
- A strong CAP within the EU Budget after 2020 is required. 
Horse racing and thoroughbred 
- Maintain the Tripartite Agreement. 
Customs Union/Single Market 
While the Committee respects the stated policy of the UK Government to leave the EU, the Single 
Market and the Customs Union, as the pragmatic implications of that decision become clearer, the 
Irish Government and EU partners should advocate for the UK to re-consider and remain within the 
Single Market and/or the Customs Union.  
Free Trade Agreement 
Should the UK, in the final agreement, withdraw from the Single Market and the Customs Union, a 
Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement that includes food and agricultural products will be needed. 
Tariff rates on food and agricultural products need to be at 0% or at minimal rates. 
Any Free Trade Agreement should include a commitment to match EU health and safety standards 
for UK products, and for products coming into the UK. 
Transitional Arrangements 
Negotiations to develop Free Trade Agreements are often long, detailed processes that cannot be 
rushed. In the event that the EU-UK negotiators believe that a full and comprehensive free trade 
agreement cannot be reached within the timeframe of the UK’s withdrawal, transitional 
arrangements should be agreed.  
State Aids 
Relaxation of state aids on farming and agri-food industry. Consideration of re-classifying the 
thoroughbred sector as ‘agriculture’ for the purposes of state aid rules. 
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Legislative Equivalence 
Efforts should be made to ensure that legislative equivalence is secured at the moment of Brexit and 
beyond in areas of animal health and safety, zootechnical and equine identification certification and 
temporary admission of animals. 
Particular attention needs to be given to those with farms with land that straddles the border. An all-
Island approach to animal health issues has been successful and such cooperation needs to be 
continued and supported in the future. 
Competitiveness 
There is a need to maintain a focus on cost competitiveness and the cost of doing business in 
Ireland, with a focus on the costs associated with energy, insurance, financing and legal costs. 
Market Support 
The Agri-Food Industry and the farming community have already seen the immediate impact of 
strong currency fluctuations between the Euro and Sterling. In the event that markets are very 
unstable in advance, and immediately following, Brexit, the Government and the European Union 
should consider putting in place direct market supports for vulnerable sectors such as farmers, 
possibly through CAP Market Support. 
During the financial crisis, an employment subsidy scheme was developed and enterprise 
stabilisation measures were applied. If the impact of Brexit is near the scale anticipated, these 
should both be re-introduced. 
Support for Innovation and Market Diversification 
Irish Agricultural products can be complex and produced to the highest standards. In developing new 
products and new attributes to existing products, the Government should consider increasing 
supports to innovation and knowledge transfer. 
Irish food companies need to continue to seek to diversify the markets in which they sell. The 
Committee heard that this was a long-term process which is complex, often reliant on: 
- developing a keen understanding of the ‘tastes’ of different populations; 
- guidance on market access; and  
- promotion.  
It may be necessary to increase the budgets of Bord Bia and other Agencies in order to support 
companies in exploring new markets.  
Support for measures which can increase production capacity should be included in this increased 
support. 
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EU Budget 
As a large Member State, the UK contributes significantly to the EU Budget. The Common 
Agricultural Programme (CAP) is due to be reviewed for the period after 2020. It will be essential 
that a strong CAP is supported in the EU Budget after 2020. 
Horse racing and thoroughbreds 
A tripartite agreement exists between the UK, Ireland and France for the free movement of 
thoroughbred horses. The Agreement predates EU law in the area and an assessment needs to 
completed by the relevant authorities to ensure that it is fit for purpose after the UK withdraws from 
the EU. In the event that the UK does not join the Customs Union, clear and separate protocols for 
the movement of live animals, especially thoroughbred horses moving through customs checks need 
to be agreed. An additional fast-track for vehicles carrying sensitive thoroughbreds through customs 
checks should be considered.  The Committee heard that consideration should be given to the 
creation of a new type of visa between the UK and Ireland for ‘professional sportsperson’ to permit 
jockeys to move easily through both jurisdictions. 
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 7. The Future of the EU 
This year the EU celebrated 60 years since its foundation, 44 of which Ireland has been a Member. 
The Committee heard that the European Union has been the “world’s most successful peace 
process”89, with concrete financial advantages for Members, and success in creating a Single 
Market, in creating uniform standards, in recognising shared values, in improving working conditions 
and rights for women, in promoting a solidarity that manifested itself by financially supporting 
regions that needed assistance to catch-up with average standards as well as many more benefits.  
Irish citizens continue to strongly endorse Ireland’s membership of the European Union. The 
recent Red C opinion poll commissioned for European Movement Ireland90 shows that 88% of all 
adults who were asked, agreed that ‘Ireland should remain a part of the EU’ and 87% agreed that 
‘taking everything into consideration, Ireland has on balance, benefited from being a member of the 
EU’. The most recent Eurobarometer on Public Opinion in the European Union91 asked citizens what 
kind of image they have of the EU92. Ireland was one of seven Member States where a positive 
image was predominant with 55% of those who answered believing that the EU was positive, 31% 
were neutral and only 13% had a negative image. 
The Committee heard that Ireland is, and should be, fully committed to its membership of the EU; 
that Ireland is settled as a fully active Member State and that the EU is a central part of how Ireland 
interacts with the global stage and how Ireland has contributed to the world. The EU-level can be a 
more effective way of addressing some of the complex, cross-cutting challenges that present 
themselves in the modern world and Ireland recognises this. 
In the immediate aftermath of the British referendum to leave the EU, many expressed a fear that it 
was the beginning of the EU slowly disintegrating. That potential seems to have waned more 
recently. Indeed both in Member States that have very recently had general elections, and others, 
EU leaders are now defending the EU with greater passion. The UK leaving the EU will of course 
change the Union, and most witnesses to the Committee who spoke on this issue, believed that the 
EU would be weakened by the departure of the UK. But, the Committee also heard that this is the 
time for Ireland to work “to make the EU more effective, and more visibly democratic.”93 
Like all organisations and bodies, the EU needs to ensure that it has a shared vision for the future, it 
needs to renew itself and for Member States to re-commit to their active engagement in 
determining its future direction. In order to do that, the EU has begun a process to support an open 
debate across the EU to create a strong EU with a post-Brexit identity. The process began with the 
publication of a White Paper on the Future of the EU94, which is being followed by Reflection Papers 
on the Social Dimension of Europe95, Harnessing Globalisation96, Deepening of the Economic and 
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Monetary Union97, the Future of European Defence98, and the future of EU finances99. The process of 
engagement is due to take place across all Member States and take a number of months, with 
significant milestones in December 2017 and at the European Parliament General Elections in June 
2019. The White Paper itself is reflective and in order to spark discussion, presents a number of 
different scenarios and ultimately asks “what future do we want for ourselves, for our children and 
for our Union?” 
While the majority of Irish citizens support continued membership and strong engagement with the 
EU, the Committee also heard an alternative view: that most of the problems “resulting from 
Brexit would be avoided if Ireland left the European Union at or around the same time as the 
UK100”. The reasons given for this position were that leaving the EU would save the State money, 
give Ireland back control of valuable sea fisheries, give Ireland control of Irish law-making, give 
Ireland back a national currency, avoid implementing a new partition of Ireland and make eventual 
Irish reunification more difficult101. 
 Potential Solutions
Future of Europe debate 
- That all stakeholders in Ireland take full part in the ‘Future of Europe’ process. 
-  That the Government consider holding an All-Island Civic Dialogue on the Future of 
Europe as part of the engagement process following the White Paper. 
- While Ireland should not advocate for any Treaty Reform, the possibility of Reform, even if 
it includes Treaty amendment, should remain possible. 
Citizens involvement 
- That the Government consider holding an All-Island Civic Dialogue on the Future of Europe 
every year so that citizens and stakeholders can increase their ongoing involvement and 
participation in Ireland’s EU involvement.  
Prepare for a post-Brexit EU 
- That the Government, through the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, continue to 
deepen existing alliances with like-minded Member States. 
- The Houses of the Oireachtas should increase the level of engagement between national 
parliaments of Members States, initially focused on parliaments from like-minded Member 
States 
- Continue to use Embassy network effectively 
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Future of Europe Debate 
The Committee agrees with a number of the speakers on the positive and profound role that the EU 
has played in Ireland and in seeing Ireland’s future as being a Member State of the EU. But no 
organisation can live solely on past glories and cannot rely on looking backwards. The Committee 
welcomed the structured approach of the White Paper Future of Europe debate as an opportunity to 
ensure that the EU is ‘future-proofed’ and is relevant now and into the future. While the Committee 
shared the opinion of many Irish citizens that on balance the EU has been positive, the Committee 
believes that there have been a number of moments and issues where the EU’s approach needed to 
be more effective and creative in seeking solutions.  
The Committee believes that it is now an appropriate time to consider, in some depth, what kind of 
EU Ireland and its citizens want to be part of. While the debate and engagement considerations 
should be led by the European Commission, European Parliament and Governments of the Member 
States, this process needs to be open, frank and involve all stakeholders. The process needs to 
consider, in some substance, how the EU can best address the substantial, complex crises that are 
there now, that can predictably be seen to occur in the future and be capable of responding to those 
challenges which cannot be predicted at the moment. The EU that Ireland renews its commitment to 
needs to be relevant now and into the future, capable of being adaptive and planning for the very 
long-term. There are so many stakeholders and organisations that operate on a European basis, that 
interact with similar organisations abroad or that may believe that the EU is too distant and not 
relevant to their work. All of them have something to add and an important contribution to make to 
the debate. 
The Committee heard about, and some Members of the Committee participated in, some of recently 
held All-Island Civic Dialogues. The Committee heard that they were a positive structure and way of 
supporting civic engagement and believes that it would be useful to hold an additional meeting to 
consider the Future of the EU. 
It is too early to predict and pre-empt what will emerge from the Future of Europe debate, and what 
priorities Irish citizens will see for the future. The Committee heard that it is possible that some 
types of change and reform could necessitate amending the Treaties. While the Committee does not 
believe that this should be encouraged or sought; if Treaty change is necessary, it should not be 
avoided. 
Citizens Involvement 
The Committee believes that the EU needs to be more visibly democratic, deliver for citizens and be 
seen to deliver for citizens. While Irish politicians, businesses, civil servants, and larger 
representative bodies are often comfortable with how the EU works, that level of confidence is not 
shared by many citizens. While there are pathways for citizens to engage with the EU, they are often 
not known or not understood and the Committee is of the opinion that there is a perception that the 
EU doesn’t always listen to citizens and the depth of their concerns and when it does, it is not 
responsive. The EU of the future needs to be brought closer to citizens and needs to have real and 
responsive ways of engagement. The Committee believes that an All-Island Civic Dialogue should be 
held not just this year (as part of the engagement process), but on an annual basis, giving citizens 
and civic organisations an on-going opportunity to input in how Ireland engages with the EU. 
 47 
Engagement on EU matters, whether specific or general, should not solely be part of campaigns (for 
example around Treaty Referenda), but there should be increased structural engagement with the 
public regularly. 
Prepare for a post-Brexit EU 
The UK leaving will change the EU. The EU would need to be considering its future pathways in any 
event, but the withdrawal of the UK will itself change the nature of the EU. At the same time the EU 
will be considering its long-term future, pursuing further integration strategies and the ordinary 
work of the EU in updating existing legislation and developing support programmes will continue. All 
of this will be happening alongside the withdrawal negotiations. 
Brexit can be considered a catalyst to strengthen strategies already developed, including:  
- To deepen alliances with other Members States and explore any new synergies.  
- To play a full, active role in the EU’s development and work with partners on priority issues; 
and 
- To engage on all issues of concern to other Member States, even if Ireland is less impacted.  
The Houses of the Oireachtas itself can play a role in continuing to develop and strengthen 
relationships and links with other national parliaments. 
The Committee believes that it is important that Ireland continues to use its Embassy network 
effectively. The Committee heard from a number of witnesses of the strength of the efforts made by 
Irish diplomats in engaging with European partners right across the European Union and support 
that work for the duration of the Brexit negotiations and beyond. 
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 8. Transport 
Brexit poses a number of challenges in the transportation sector affecting aviation, cross-border 
public transport and travel to and transit through the United Kingdom to the rest of the European 
Union. These issues also overlap to a significant level with matters pertaining to the CTA, Northern 
Ireland, trade and the future relationship of the UK with the EU. 
This section is confined to the practical elements of transportation networks in the post-Brexit 
context, including: 
- the operation of cross-border services; 
- air routes and freight transportation; and 
- infrastructural development. 
102 The Transport Sector in Numbers
Air Travel 
- 100,000 aircraft and 11 million passengers move between Ireland and the United Kingdom 
per annum. 
- The London-Dublin air route is the busiest air route in Europe and the second-busiest in 
the world. 
- The aviation sector is worth €4.1 billion to Irish GDP. 
Commuting 
- The CSO states that 14,751 people cross the border for work or study.103 
Freight 
- Seaborne freight accounts for 84% of Ireland’s trade in volume and 62% in value. 
- Dublin Port handles 46% of all seaborne trade in volume. Approximately 60% of trade at 
Dublin Port involves the UK. 
Travel to / from UK 
- There were over 3.5 million trips from the UK to Ireland in 2015. 
- In 2015, there were over 1.9 million trips from Ireland to the UK and 336,000 trips to 
Northern Ireland. 
- Visitors to Ireland from the UK spent an average of €274, while visitors from Ireland to the 
UK spent an average of €490. 
During the first phase of the All-Island Civic Dialogue, the Department of Transport, Tourism and 
Sport held a session on All-Island Transport and Logistics. This consisted of over 110 participants 
from North and South representing Freight, Maritime, Aviation and Public Transport sectors, as well 
as representatives from Business Associations, Local Authorities and Government Departments.104 
A number of challenges and opportunities were highlighted in the course of this dialogue. These 
included general issues such as currency exposure, access to labour and the impact on regional 
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development. Challenges already identified include the rapid increase in used vehicle imports from 
Northern Ireland while in haulage services, some Eastern European drivers based in Northern Ireland 
have already relocated home. There are possible opportunities in establishing direct routes with 
continental Europe, but significant investment may be required to adapt Irish ports. There is also an 
issue of pressure to complete current North-South and East-West projects as a result of Brexit. 
At European level, a number of arrangements are in place to facilitate international public transport 
within the European Union. Bus services are governed by Regulation 1073/2009, which sets out the 
conditions for intra-EU cross-border bus services. For rail services, the principles governing the 
interoperability of rail networks are set out in Directive 2008/57/EC (as amended).105 Directive 
2012/34/EU sets out the single European railway area.106 This is the basis in EU Law for operating 
cross-border transport networks and services. 
Overall, the transport infrastructure may require considerable investment. This could include 
modifying Irish ports to deal with customs checks and greater volumes of travel to the post-Brexit 
EU, for example direct routes to France.  At a European level, funding is concentrated on 
infrastructural development under the trans-European transport infrastructure policy (TEN-T), which 
focuses on nine core, competitive freight network corridors.107 Ireland is covered by the North Sea 
Mediterranean corridor. 
Northern Ireland – Specific Concerns 
Under present arrangements transport matters, other than navigation and civil aviation, are 
devolved to the Northern Ireland Executive.  This means that services can be aligned for public 
transport between Ireland and Northern Ireland with the agreement of the Government and the 
Northern Ireland Executive. 
The shape of border controls is a significant concern and may result in a severe impact on service 
times and reliability, as well as impacting those who rely on these transport services to commute 
and access other services. However, challenges particular to each sector will require individual 
solutions. 
 Summary and Potential Solutions
Common Travel Area 
- A preferred solution is maintaining the Common Travel Area on the island of Ireland to the 
closest possible extent and avoiding a situation where passport checks have to be 
completed along the border. 
Rail Services 
- While the ideal solution on the issue of border controls is the continuance of the Common 
Travel Area, in the event of a hard Brexit, a method of passport checks causing minimal 
disruption to cross-border rail services should be pursued. 
- Agreements establishing the Enterprise rail service between Dublin and Belfast are 
expected to be unaffected, but this should be monitored closely. 
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Bus Services 
- Any post-Brexit regulation should reflect, as close as possible, the provisions of Regulation 
1073/2009. The Committee does not believe the Inter-Bus Agreement is a viable 
alternative, as it applies only to occasional passenger travel, rather than the regular bus 
services which constantly operate.108 
Other Public Transport Issues 
- Legislation on both sides of the border will be required for cross-border taxi services. 
- There is no expected impact on free travel either side of the border. 
Aviation 
- Separate EU-UK and US-UK Open Skies Agreements will need to be agreed to replace the 
current EU-US Open Skies arrangements, to which the UK will no longer be a party. 
- The Committee recommends that a new agreement is put in place before Spring 2018, so 
air routes for 2018 / 2019 are not adversely impacted. 
- The reintroduction of duty free for passengers to the UK could be positive. 
- There is a need for Ireland to deepen connectivity, in particular long-haul connectivity. 
Ports and Freight 
- Significant investment may be required to adapt Irish ports to cater for higher volumes of 
freight and increase capacity for direct links to continental Europe. 
- Allowing private concessions to operate Ireland’s ports in order to obtain investment for 
further development without impacting on group debts of current operators should be 
explored. 
- Adding projects that develop Irish ports to the trans-European transport policy (TEN-T) 
should be explored. 
Bus Services 
Bus services crossing the border are likely to face significant challenges as a result of the UK exit 
from the European Union. For example, the Bus Éireann service from Dublin/Monaghan to 
Letterkenny is required to cross the border twice, at the River Blackwater near Aughnacloy and again 
at Strabane / Lifford.109 The imposition of a hard border may result in significant delays at either 
point if a hard border and passport controls are introduced. 
It is important that any post-Brexit regulation should reflect, as close as possible, the provisions of 
Regulation EC No 1073/2009, allowing for regular cross-border passenger services conducive to an 
all-island economy.110 The Committee heard that the Interbus Agreement was a suitable alternative. 
However, as this applies to occasional travel, it may not be suitable for public transport routes that 
must cross Northern Ireland, such as the Dublin-Letterkenny route, nor would it be suitable for local 
services. 
Rail Services 
The Committee also heard that Irish Rail and Translink cooperate in running the Enterprise rail 
service between Dublin and Belfast. This service also stops at Drogheda, Dundalk, Newry and 
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Portadown, with connecting services within both Ireland and Northern Ireland.111 It operates eight 
services in each direction per day and five services in each direction per day on Sundays. It is a 
partnership between Irish Rail and Translink and the Committee heard that it can continue to 
operate post-Brexit as the agreements establishing it are expected to be unaffected. 
Notwithstanding this positive viewpoint, two issues were identified by the Committee which could 
impact on services, i.e. border controls and connecting services. 
While there is one land border between the EU and the UK, there are two rail borders, the Dublin-
Belfast line and the Eurostar through the Channel Tunnel. With respect to the Channel Tunnel, 
border controls are applied in advance of boarding. This is due to the United Kingdom’s non-
participation in the Schengen Area and likewise, the non-participation of Belgium and France in the 
Common Travel Area. Accordingly, the UK, France and Belgium agreed to a tripartite arrangement 
providing for border controls to take place before passengers boarded services between these 
countries.112 
The ideal solution on the issue of border controls is the continuance of the Common Travel Area, 
with no passport checks required for passengers. However, a procedure for performing customs 
checks at stations prior to boarding may have to be pursued, as is the case with the Eurostar service 
between London and continental Europe. In an Irish context, passengers on other transport services 
like air and sea which run directly from Ireland to continental Europe are already subject to border 
controls due to Irish non-participation in the Schengen Area. 
During hearings, the Committee was told of the possible scenarios that may arise if a hard border is 
imposed. For example, border controls could take the form of leaving the train and going through a 
passport office at the frontier, as is the case between Bulgaria and Turkey. In another example, 
passport controls could be conducted when the train is moving, as is the case for the frontier 
between Finland and Russia. It seems the most viable option for train services is to complete 
passport checks while the train is moving or to impose border controls similar to airports at the 
relevant train stations prior to boarding. This would require significant expenditure to implement 
and significant dedication of resources to immigration and law enforcement functions.113 
An additional complication is the number of railway stations between Belfast and Dublin. There are 
36 such stations and the Committee heard that there is a concern that customers on other services, 
such as the DART, will be able to access the Enterprise simply by getting off at the same platform it 
calls at.114 Adapting rail services to prevent this may involve infrastructural changes making it more 
difficult for those using local services to disembark and board the Enterprise service at the platform. 
Of course, the maintenance of the Common Travel Area would alleviate this as a possible issue. 
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Taxi Services and Free Travel 
Regulatory divergence between Ireland and Northern Ireland may impact the taxi service directly, 
leading to situations whereby a taxi driver licensed to operate in Ireland, may not be able to cross 
the border legally while operating a service. Following Brexit, it will be necessary for this issue to be 
resolved with primary legislation on both sides of the border, permitting taxi operators to take 
passengers from one side of the border to the other.115 It is suggested that this is prioritised once the 
terms of the final withdrawal agreement and the agreement establishing a new EU-UK relationship 
are known. 
The Committee heard from the National Transport Authority that it does not believe the free travel 
scheme will be impacted by Brexit.116  
Ms Anne Graham, representing the National Transport Authority, described the all-island free travel 
scheme to the Committee: 
“in April 2007 the all-Ireland free travel scheme for seniors resident in all parts of the 
island was introduced. The scheme enables seniors, 66 and over, resident in the republic 
to travel free of charge on all bus and rail services in Northern Ireland. Likewise, seniors, 
65 and over, in the North can travel free of charge on bus, rail, air and ferry services 
participating in the free travel scheme in this State. The Northern Ireland authorities 
require that Department of Social Protection (DSP) customers wishing to avail of free 
travel in Northern Ireland should do so using a similar smartpass as used by their 
Northern counterparts.” 
The Committee also heard that the arrangements are not expected to be impacted by Brexit. This is 
reassuring and the Committee noted the advice provided that those availing of free travel across the 
border should use a similar smart-pass to their Northern Irish counterparts. 
Aviation 
The aviation sector is worth approximately €4 billion to the Irish economy.117 The Committee heard 
that aviation is likely to be considered similar to agriculture, pharmaceuticals and automobiles, 
which are considered sectors that could still function in the absence of a final agreement, but this is 
not the case as airlines operating between the EU/US and the UK cannot operate in the absence of a 
law or agreement. 
Civil aviation poses one of the most significant challenges identified by the Committee, with a high 
level of concern regarding the need to replace the Open Skies Agreement between the EU and the 
United States.118 The Open Skies Agreement allows for airlines based in the European Union to 
operate transatlantic flights to the United States and vice versa. While it allows American airlines to 
operate intra-EU flights, it does not permit the same from EU airlines in the United States. Similar, 
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airline slots are allocated based on EU legislation.119 There is a concern that a delay in agreeing new 
EU-UK-US arrangements will significantly impact the allocation of new slots, particularly for 2018-
2019 as the UK is due to leave the EU in March 2019, and this creates a high level of uncertainty. 
The Committee heard that following Brexit, a new Open Skies Agreement would have to be put in 
place between the USA and the UK, with a separate agreement between the UK and the EU. The 
Committee heard that the text used for the 121 open skies arrangements operating in the American 
context was similar.120 These replacement agreements will be necessary to ensure that civil aviation 
continues undisrupted at the moment of Brexit and under similar arrangements to the present 
agreement. 
The Committee heard that there may be some small positive developments following Brexit,  for 
example the reintroduction of duty free for travellers between the UK and EU.121 The need to 
continue to develop connectivity, especially long-haul connectivity was highlighted to the 
Committee, in particular the importance of completing projects such as the northern runway as soon 
as possible.122 
Ports and Freight 
Navigation and merchant shipping remains a reserved competence of the UK Government, so cannot 
be determined in conjunction with Northern Ireland.123 As freight arrangements are related to trade, 
negotiations will be between the United Kingdom and the European Union, so there is little scope 
for a bilateral agreement between Dublin and Belfast. There are a number of possible solutions to 
the impacts on the UK land bridge for freight travelling to continental Europe, relating to both air 
and sea travel, particularly in the context of goods and services. 
Proposals to address this are addressed in Chapter 2, but there are some issues that relate more 
specifically to transport and the practical and infrastructural issues pertaining to Ireland’s seaports, 
many of which account for roll-on, roll-off (RORO) services. The All-Island Civic Dialogue highlighted 
that a shift to load on, load off (LOLO) may result in a decreased demand for road haulage services, 
and there are possible opportunities in new direct shipping routes between Ireland and continental 
Europe, as well as direct air freight routes.124 It is not clear if these are commercially viable and, in 
any event, while investment for increased traffic directly to continental Europe is needed, the use of 
the land-bridge is considered fundamental to Ireland’s trading model in goods. Solutions need to be 
found for continued passage through the UK of goods meant for the EU market. The Committee 
heard that maintaining seamless transport links to the UK, including the land-bridge, and a seamless 
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transition to new arrangements, including clarity on the future EU-UK relationship and avoiding a 
cliff-edge as a priority.125 
Following Brexit, additional infrastructure and capital expenditure will likely be required to adapt 
Irish ports to deal with customs checks and cater for larger volumes of freight, as well as accounting 
for changes in ferry patterns to allow for more frequent ferry travel to the continent. For example, 
Irish Rail highlighted to the Committee that it (Irish Rail) is the port authority for Rosslare Europort 
and suggested that investment vehicles could be put in place to allow for additional development 
that does not impact on the debt levels of Irish semi-state companies that own the ports.126 
Similarly, the inclusion of Irish ports in the trans-European transport policy (TEN-T) may allow for 
additional infrastructural funding for the necessary modifications to Irish ports. 
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 9. Energy 
The production of energy, while not one of the primary issues discussed since the UK referendum, is 
an issue that the Committee considers to be extremely important. Ireland’s energy needs are 
particularly dependent on the UK to maintain full security of supply through interconnection. At the 
same time, Northern Ireland has a particular reliance on Ireland for its energy needs and the 
establishment of the Single Electricity Market has significantly aided cooperation across the island. 
In its negotiating document, the Government has highlighted this importance even further: 
“Ireland’s energy interconnections to the EU via the UK and heavy reliance on the UK as 
a source of energy imports raises the possibility of Brexit posing security of supply 
challenges. Brexit could pose a potential threat to the functioning of the all-island Single 
Electricity Market, which enables Ireland and Northern Ireland to maximise market 
efficiencies and ensures security of electricity supply at an affordable cost for 
consumers.” 
Energy was also raised in the all-island sectoral dialogues, with a number of key themes emerging: 
All-Island Sectoral Dialogue - Themes127 
- Risk to the security of energy supply; the negative impact of uncertainty on energy 
investment decisions; fear of tariffs; and concern over potential divergence of energy and 
climate policy between the UK and Ireland. 
- Importance of investment to reduce reliance on gas and oil and the need to keep energy 
high on the agenda in the negotiations. 
- De-carbonisation and a drive towards energy independence were suggested as potential 
mitigation strategies. 
- Significant concern on the risks to the All-Island Single Electricity Market and there is a need 
to better communicate its importance to consumers. Horizon 2020 funding important for 
North/South cooperation on research into renewable energy. 
- A number of potential opportunities for Ireland were considered including; exporting clean 
energy to the U K, becoming more self-sufficient in energy, and as a leader in innovation and 
research. 
The Minister for Communications, Climate Action and Environment, Mr Denis Naughton TD, further 
underlined these concerns, stating that: 
“I think it is fair to say that the energy relationship Ireland has with the UK is unique 
when compared to other European countries and other sectors. Although other 
European countries have significant energy relationships with the UK, no country has the 
level of reliance that Ireland has. Furthermore, when I look across the other sectors of 
the Irish economy, I also view energy as unique. Many sectors of the Irish economy have 
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high levels of trade with the UK. However, the energy sector has one of the highest 
levels of interdependence with the UK.”128 
The statistics relating to Ireland’s energy sector further underline the importance of cooperation 
between the UK and Ireland. 
The Energy Sector in Numbers 
- Ireland has increased its production of renewable energy from 5% in 1990 to 44% in 2014. 
- As part of the increase in renewable sources, wind power has increased from under 1% of 
total primary energy production in 1990 to 22% in 2014. 
- By contrast, natural gas as a proportion of total energy production has fallen from 54% in 
1990 to 6% in 2014. 
- For the natural and manufactured gas commodity group in 2016, imports were valued at 
€719.8 million, while exports were valued at €13.3 million.129 
- For the natural and manufactured gas commodity group in 2016, imports of electric 
current were valued at €14.2 million, while exports were valued at €50 million.130 
These statistics firstly highlight the significant growth in renewable sources of energy, but also 
highlight the importance of imports, particularly in the gas sector. There has been a significant drive 
to decarbonise the Irish energy market, with more emphasis on fuels such as natural gas and 
renewable sources of energy over fossil fuels. The Sectoral Dialogue highlighted possible 
opportunities for the export of clean energy and self-sufficiency. 
Challenges 
The challenges identified for the energy sector pre and post-Brexit include: 
- The future of the Single Electricity Market (SEM) and the Integrated Single Electricity Market 
(I-SEM)131; 
- Security of Supply; 
- The future of interconnection with the UK and possible interconnection with France; 
- Prices and consumer impacts for both gas and electricity; 
- Opportunities for Ireland, particularly in the renewable energy sector; and 
- Obligations Ireland may have to meet as part of the Energy Union. 
A number of the challenges discussed in previous chapters are relevant, most notably: 
- Challenges regarding trade, infrastructure and particular issues concerning Northern Ireland; 
- The potential post-Brexit regulatory divergence; and  
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- the geographic position of Ireland may necessitate direct interconnection with mainland 
Europe.132 The Committee heard this is achievable through the Celtic Interconnector project 
(discussed below). 
 Summary and Potential Solutions
Single Electricity Market 
- The maintenance of the SEM and the progression of the I-SEM are key components of the 
all-island economy. 
- Guarantee the functionality of the I-SEM by ensuring adequate data protection rules are 
deemed to apply in the UK. 
Interconnectors 
- The preferred solution is the facilitation of the seamless interconnection of energy 
between the EU and the UK as part of the negotiated agreement on the future EU-UK 
relationship. 
- In the event of a hard Brexit, the most prominent solution post-Brexit is the completion of 
the Celtic Interconnector between Ireland and France, which would reduce Ireland’s 
reliance on the UK. A transition period may be needed here to ensure the interconnector 
is completed.  
Gas 
- Derogations under the European Gas Directive should continue to be available to Ireland 
post-Brexit. 
- While the imposition of a tariff poses no financial risk to Gas Networks Ireland, it may 
increase the cost to the consumer and negatively impact the competitiveness of gas. A 
zero tariff at EU level should continue and be included in an EU-UK free trade agreement. 
Electricity 
- The preferred solution is the maintenance of the SEM and the completion of the I-SEM. 
- The free-flow of electricity through inter-connectors, particularly through the completion 
of the Celtic Interconnector, should be a priority. 
- Investment in the Irish market is important and recommitting to Ireland’s energy 
challenges, including new ways in which to address these challenges, should be explored. 
- Due to the falling cost of technology, more opportunities exist for the offshore generation 
of wind energy. 
Security of Supply 
- In the case of gas, a voluntary protocol exists between Gas Networks Ireland and National 
Grid (UK gas network operator) to address emergencies. This needs to be secured post-
Brexit. 
- On the issue of regulatory compliance, Ireland should request a derogation from EU 
energy legislation post-Brexit to maintain security of gas supply arrangements with the UK. 
However, if this is not possible, then the costs and benefits to consumers must be 
considered in any decisions to build new gas infrastructure. 
Single Electricity Market 
In relation to the electricity grid, the Committee heard that EirGrid is a fully integrated business, 
owning its Northern Irish equivalent, SONI. The regulation of the electricity grid is operated 
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cooperatively between the Irish Commission for Energy Regulation and the Northern Irish utility 
regulator, UREGNI, through the Single Electricity Market Committee.133 
The Committee heard that there is explicit recognition at both official and political level in Brussels, 
London and Dublin that the all-island SEM should not be impacted by Brexit and that it has operated 
very successfully for the past ten years. The Committee heard that the next step for the 
development of the SEM is the I-SEM, with a connection to the wider European internal energy 
market. 
With particular regard to the SEM, the Committee is also aware of concerns regarding the processing 
of (citizens’) data between an EU Member State and a non-EU Member State. In a scenario where 
there is no decision by the European Commission that the UK is considered to provide adequate 
protection for any data transferred to its jurisdiction, Ireland would be legally obliged to refuse to 
transfer the personal data to any data processor, e.g. an energy provider, distributor or regulator, in 
Northern Ireland.134 Should this arise, the establishment of “safe harbour principles” similar to data 
protection provisions between the EU and the United States would need to be finalised. 
Interconnectors 
There are currently a number of interconnectors for gas and electricity between Ireland and the 
United Kingdom. For gas, there are two interconnectors with Scotland that service Ireland, Northern 
Ireland and the Isle of Man. For electricity, there is an East-West interconnector between north 
Dublin and north Wales and a second proposed North-South interconnector between Ireland and 
Northern Ireland.135 The island of Ireland is currently served with a second electricity interconnector 
at Moyle in Northern Ireland. 
On the overall matter of interconnection, the Committee heard that Gas Infrastructure Europe took 
the view that energy should not be used in any negotiations between Europe and the UK. The 
Committee heard that there are precedents for interconnection between the EU and third countries, 
e.g. Poland (EU) and Ukraine / Belarus (non-EU), and that progression of these arrangements 
depends on how these third countries accept the rules of the internal energy market in Europe.136 
An option for additional interconnection post-Brexit exists with France, through the construction of 
the proposed Celtic Interconnector across the Celtic Sea. The Committee heard that while this is 
likely to be feasible and grant funding made available for the overall project (depending on the 
criteria involved), the additional capacity offered by the Celtic Interconnector may not be accessible 
until 2022 at least. 
When completed, the Celtic Interconnector is expected to have capacity to support electricity for 
450,000 homes. The Committee is satisfied that this is a possible addition for securing Ireland’s 
energy needs in the event of a hard Brexit. As it will not be available until 2022, a transition period 
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for Ireland may be necessary, in line with specific phasing-in arrangements for Ireland, as discussed 
in Chapter 2.  
Gas Regulation and Prices 
The Committee heard that as the UK is transposing all existing EU legislation into UK legislation, then 
no immediate negative repercussions are anticipated at the moment of Brexit. However, regulatory 
divergence remains a concern after that, particularly for future legislation that the EU agrees but the 
UK decides not to implement, or that the UK devises and implements for itself. The Committee 
heard that under the third European gas directive, derogations are possible, but would need to be 
sought, and that cross-border requirements under EU gas legislation can already apply to 
interconnection points with third countries. 
In relation to the cost of gas and the potential for increased costs, the Committee heard that the 
maximum tariff that could be applied to the imports of all gases is 0.7% compared to a zero tariff to 
gas imports that the EU currently applies. Should a tariff between 0% and 0.7% be applied then this 
may result in an increased costs for the consumer. Depending on tariffs applied to other fuels, the 
Committee heard that this could also adversely affect the competitiveness of gas. An increase in the 
cost of gas could impact attempts to decarbonise the Irish energy sector through the use of natural 
gas.137 The continuance of a zero tariff by the EU for gas and the inclusion of this in a free trade 
agreement with the UK would be preferable. 
Electricity Regulation and Prices 
The Committee heard from Mr Rodney Doyle, representing EirGrid, that any move from the current 
model would result in an increase to electricity prices both in Ireland and Northern Ireland as it 
would have a negative impact on competitiveness and security of supply. Maintaining the 
development of the I-SEM to ensure minimal prices and cost competitiveness is a solution the 
Government should explore.  Achieving the Celtic Interconnector with France would have a further 
positive impact on prices and the Committee heard that in its absence, prices may be higher, as 
when operators engage in market coupling, there is the benefit of being linked to the lower price 
zone of their partners. 
There should be a further drive to increase the amount of renewable energy generated in Ireland. 
The Committee heard of the potential for wave energy and wind energy, with a particular example 
being the potential for 4.5 GW of electricity to be generated by wind power off the east coast. In the 
case of wind energy, the Committee further heard that its main challenge is technology and that 
advances in technology for wind power production far outweigh the advances for wave energy. 
Finally, the Committee heard that the falling cost of technology may present a real opportunity for 
Ireland to produce energy offshore in the future. 
Security of Supply 
In the case of gas, two issues arise, namely physical security of gas supply and regulatory 
compliance. The physical infrastructure connecting Ireland and the UK will not change post-Brexit in 
relation to supply. The Committee heard that Northern Ireland and the Isle of Man’s dependence on 
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Gas Networks Ireland’s infrastructure in turn emphasises the importance of continued cooperation 
between Ireland and the United Kingdom. A voluntary protocol exists between Gas Networks Ireland 
and National Grid (the UK network operator) for addressing gas emergencies and the Committee 
heard that there is no reason for these arrangements to change post-Brexit. They should therefore 
be protected. 
In relation to regulatory compliance, the Committee heard that under Regulation (EU) 994/2010 and 
a revision due to be approved this year, Member States are required to ensure that in the event of 
disruption to the single largest piece of gas infrastructure supplying the Member State, the 
remaining infrastructure is able to satisfy total gas demand on a day of exceptionally high demand. 
This is known as the N-1 test.138 Ireland and the UK are grouped for the purposes of this 
requirement, with the UK capacity able to satisfy Ireland’s required gas demand.139 
As the UK will no longer be a Member State, an accommodation for Ireland under EU legislation will 
be required, so Ireland can continue security of supply measures with the UK. Without this, Ireland 
would be obliged to build significant additional gas network infrastructure. The development of the 
Shannon (Liquefied Natural Gas) LNG terminal, as well as the use of renewable energy technologies 
in the gas industry, e.g. the harnessing of bio-gas in the agriculture and food sectors and supplying 
this gas to the gas network, could provide some part of the solution. However, these solutions are 
not viable in the short-term. 
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 10. Education, Research and the Irish Language 
Challenges 
Brexit creates a number of challenges in these sectors, with key concerns including: 
- The future of EU funded programmes involving the United Kingdom, including the Erasmus+ 
Programme and PEACE/INTERREG funding; 
- Mobility of students between the UK and Ireland, particularly issues pertaining to freedom 
of movement and university fees; 
- Mutual recognition of academic and professional qualifications and the future of cross-
border apprenticeships; 
- There is a need for Ireland to attract additional researchers, and there are related challenges 
regarding infrastructure to attract new talent as well as investment. 
- The promotion and development of the Irish language in Northern Ireland. 
- The Committee heard that the UK is considered a leader in scientific research and innovation 
 Research, Education and Irish in Numbers
- As of February 2017, researchers in institutions and companies in Ireland have won a total 
of €386 million in EU funding from Horizon 2020. 
- In 2016, 2,421 students from the UK were studying in Irish third level institutions.140  
In 2017, the number of UK students in Irish colleges has increased to 2,812.141 
- It is estimated that by 2020, four million people will have participated in the Erasmus 
Programme. 
- In the Erasmus Programme, the UK receives 30,183 students from other EU countries and 
14,801 UK students attend universities in other EU countries. 
- 4,200 people in Northern Ireland stated their main language is Irish in the 2011 Census of 
Northern Ireland, while 11% of respondents had some ability in Irish.142 
 
 Summary and Potential Solutions
Research 
- The maintenance of strong collaborations between Ireland and the UK in the area of 
scientific research. 
- Ireland should put more emphasis on leading and winning research projects within the 
Horizon 2020 framework programme and future framework programmes.  
Talent 
- There is an opportunity to attract academics from the UK. This, as a solution, may need to 
be integrated with infrastructural projects for building more housing and office space, as 
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well as with the additional funding of research and an ability to enhance remuneration 
packages for notable academics. 
Erasmus Programme 
- The continued participation of the UK in the Erasmus Programme is essential, particularly 
as English is a working language of the EU. EEA Member States and Turkey all have access 
to this Programme. Switzerland is currently suspended from the programme due to 
restrictions on the free movement of people, which has resonance with the Brexit 
scenarios 
Third Level Education Generally 
- The safeguarding of current equivalence for EU students from third-level fees should be 
considered in the UK and for UK students in either the whole EU or in Ireland. Generally, 
non-EU students have to pay full rates of tuition fees. The ideal solution is the continuance 
of current arrangements between the UK and the EU (as part of the agreement on their 
future relationship). 
- The creation of a single education sector or area for Irish and Northern Irish students, 
either as a temporary measure or permanent arrangement, is another solution which may 
mitigate the impact of Brexit. 
Gaeilge / Irish Language 
- Preserving access to Irish-medium education should not be impeded as a result of Brexit. 
The Committee heard that continued access to Irish-medium education for students from 
Northern Ireland is important for developing the Irish language in Northern Ireland. 
- Solutions previously discussed on the protection of cross-border workers, including the 
continuance of the Common Travel Area and a soft border in the context of travel apply 
equally to organisations working in the Irish language sector. 
Young People and Brexit 
- Full utilisation by Ireland of funds such as the Global Adjustment Fund and the Youth 
Guarantee should be explored. 
Research and Higher Education 
The Committee heard that Brexit presents the opportunity for Ireland to attract academics and 
researchers who may wish to leave the UK, but at least three challenges have already been identified 
including the provision of office space, pay and access to housing. A solution offered by Trinity 
College Dublin was the enhancement of remuneration packages for notable academics. Similar to 
concerns in attracting FDI, attracting researchers may be impacted by housing availability. 
The Committee heard that as 88% of scientific collaboration on successful EU programmes does not 
involve the UK, Ireland is not overly dependent on the UK for scientific collaboration, and this could 
be managed with good planning and through diversifying the funding base. In contrast, the 
Committee heard that Northern Ireland is very dependent on Ireland for its collaborations. The 
Committee suggests that this may be alleviated through including Northern Ireland in the EEA or 
establishing a single education area on the island of Ireland. 
Erasmus Programme 
The Committee heard that the Erasmus Programme is one of the EU’s greatest success stories. 
Representing the European Youth Forum, Mr David Garrahy told the Committee that “Erasmus is a 
fundamental way for Europe to start discovering and knowing itself”. The Committee heard that 
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young people in the UK seem to recognise this as, between 2007 and 2014 the number of UK 
participants in Erasmus increased by 115%.143 The Committee observes that continued engagement 
of the UK in the Erasmus Programme may be instrumental to strengthening its future relationship 
and good understanding with the EU and for EU students to understand the UK. 
Inclusion in Erasmus may be impacted by choices made on the free movement of people and the 
Committee notes that members of the EEA, as well as Turkey and Switzerland participate in the 
Erasmus programme. The continued inclusion of the United Kingdom is therefore possible. In 2014, 
Switzerland was suspended from the Erasmus Programme following restrictions it placed on the free 
movement of people. The Committee heard that this suspension is still in force, with Swiss students 
currently unable to access the programme. The UK’s position on free movement is therefore very 
important to continued participation. 
Fees 
The Committee heard that Brexit may result in fees for UK students of €18,000 to €20,000 per year 
as non-EU students in EU universities, which may mean that many students may not be in a position 
to attend third level education in Ireland as they have in the past. The Committee heard that Ireland 
could offer guarantees in this respect, but with significant financial impact, the ideal solution is 
continued cooperation on access to education in the final agreement on the EU-UK future 
relationship. 
Mutual Cooperation 
While the mutual recognition of qualifications must be maintained, the Committee heard that there 
is an opportunity in the orientation of Irish universities and education institutions towards the other 
EU Member States, through the development of cooperation with EU universities and by using 
Ireland’s highly developed education infrastructure to support projects and partners currently 
supported by UK universities. 
Other Issues 
A specific issue raised with the Committee was the impact of a hard border on students. The 
Committee heard that a permit system would allow students and educators to move quickly and 
easily across the post-Brexit border. 
The issue of nationality may be relevant to third level grants. The Committee heard that Student 
Universal Support Ireland (SUSI) can only provide maintenance grants for third level to EU citizens, 
with students from Northern Ireland potentially ineligible post-Brexit. The preferred solution is to 
preserve current arrangements for the award of maintenance grants on the island of Ireland. A much 
broader solution to this and many other potential problems may be to allow all current UK citizens 
to retain EU citizenship.144 
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Gaeilge / Irish Language 
Similar to the issues identified in the higher education sector, the Committee heard that most of the 
9,000 students who visit the Donegal Gaeltacht annually come from Northern Ireland and summer 
colleges in the Gaeltacht contribute significantly to tourism in their local areas. The Committee 
heard that the imposition of a hard border could result in additional challenges for both Irish 
speaking communities and those who wish to access Irish-medium education.  
The Committee heard from Foras na Gaeilge on the possible impacts on the Irish-language sector, 
such as the attractiveness of employment opportunities and the work of organisations that promote 
the Irish language.145 
The derogation that applies to Irish as an official language of the EU is due to end in 2021. This 
means that all documentation from the EU will be translated in Irish and not selected documents as 
is currently the case. A challenge exists in the all-island context as Irish speakers living in Northern 
Ireland may face additional barriers in accessing the employment opportunities at European level 
which may, in turn, negatively impact the Irish language generally in Northern Ireland. 
Young People and Brexit 
The Committee heard that 73% of 18 to 24 year olds and 61% of 25 to 34 year olds in the UK voted 
to remain. In Ireland, 90% of 18-24 year olds and 90% of 25-34 year olds indicated that they believed 
that Ireland should remain a part of the EU.146 The Committee heard that the removal of border 
controls resulted in young people developing a more open mindset, as they began to see 
opportunities in the place of borders or obstacles. 
The Committee also heard that young people are among the first to experience unemployment in 
the event of an economic downturn. This has been evidenced with the high rates of youth 
unemployment in the most distressed economies, including Ireland, during the recent recession. The 
Committee heard that funds such as the Global Adjustment Fund and the Youth Guarantee could 
equip young people with additional skills for employment. 
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 11. Health 
Background 
The Committee heard of a number of challenges in the health sector described during its hearings, 
one of the most serious of which is the access to healthcare for those living in the Border regions. 
Particularly for areas where the closest hospital or emergency care is located on the other side of 
the border, this is vital. The Government has acknowledged that “a key issue for this sector will be to 
ensure that there is minimum disruption to health services and that essential services are 
maintained on a cross-Border, all-island and Ireland-UK basis”.147 
Summary and Potential Solutions 
Cross Border Health Care 
- The most important solution is to ensure that there are no new obstacles to the access to 
healthcare on the island of Ireland and that the status quo is maintained. 
- The maintenance of the CTA may be a very important aspect to ensuring this care, 
particularly in ensuring that healthcare professionals travel freely to work and cooperate in 
joint initiatives. 
- The Irish and UK authorities should ensure mutual cooperation in the healthcare sector 
through bilateral arrangements. This could include the establishment of negotiating bodies 
between Ireland and the UK to replace negotiations that would have happened at EU level, 
which could be explored provided it is compatible with Ireland’s continued membership of 
the EU. 
Rights of Healthcare Workers 
- The retention of the rights of UK and EU citizens in each others’ jurisdictions post-Brexit, 
with particular rights to permanent residence granted to doctors, including those in the UK 
for less than five years. 
- The mutual recognition of qualifications must be retained. 
- While there are concerns over the number of Irish medical professionals moving to the UK, 
particularly nurses and midwives, further incentives to keep such workers in Ireland could be 
explored. The importance of UK programmes in training healthcare workers should also be 
recognised. 
Regulation 
- There are concerns that common European rules on pharmaceuticals, medical devices, data 
protection, as well as legislation aiding the movement of health care professionals may no 
longer apply, and not be replaced by something similar. 
- It is imperative that common standards on patient safety, medical education and training are 
maintained between the EU and the UK post-Brexit. The cross-border recognition of patient 
prescriptions should be maintained, as well as arrangements for the secure transfer of 
patient data from one side of the border to the other. 
European Medicines Agency 
- Ireland’s bid for the relocation of the European Medicines Agency (EMA) is welcome and 
could present a number of opportunities and benefits for Ireland and Northern Ireland. 
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Cross Border Healthcare and Irish-UK Cooperation 
A key concern is the provision of health services on an all-island basis. The Committee heard that 
careful planning must be undertaken to ensure that cross-border cooperation in health care 
continues. One solution proposed is the establishment of a cross border committee which would 
include political leaders and stakeholders, to examine the impact of Brexit on both existing and and 
future health care services, with a view to ensuring that watertight agreements are in place for 
future collaboration. 
Particular concerns arise in the access to health care for those living in the Border regions.   During 
hearings, this Committee heard that 53,000 people in the Border areas benefitted from health and 
social care services under the INTERREG IVA Programme. The Committee also heard that there are 
30,000 frontier workers who are entitled to access care in both jurisdictions and both UK and Irish 
nationals are entitled to access necessary care under the European Health Insurance Card.148  The 
Joint Committee on Health also highlighted the possible impact of border checks in its recent report. 
The Committee heard that the HSE purchases a number of treatment services from the UK, including 
organ transplants and the treatment of lymphoedema, as well as the purchase of care from the UK 
under the waiting lists initiative and on a case-by-case basis. This included 574 patients under the 
treatment abroad scheme.149 
With respect to collaborative arrangements, the Committee heard that:150 
- Future scenarios should be developed to assess risks and barriers to patient care and ensure 
that access to services, treatment and follow on care is seamless; 
- Long-term cost and funding arrangements for current and future collaborative care must be 
secured; and 
- Mechanisms must be put in place to ensure the timely movement across the border of 
ambulances, patients and healthcare professionals post-Brexit. 
Central to this, the Committee also heard that where the EU facilitated cross-border healthcare 
through common rules, ongoing cooperation must be ensured through bilateral cooperation. 
Rights of Healthcare Workers 
There are two central issues concerning the rights of healthcare workers following the UK 
withdrawal from the EU: 
1) The right to work and residence 
2) The mutual recognition of qualifications. 
This first concern is in the area of citizens’ rights, particularly in the rights to work and to residency. 
The Committee heard that permanent residence should be granted to EEA citizens working as 
doctors in the UK and vice versa. The Committee also heard that if such workers are resident for 
fewer than five years, it should not become an obstacle to this. The Committee heard that 
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traditionally, there has been a very healthy ‘sharing’ and movement of medical professionals 
between Ireland and the UK, whether this is for training or long term work, with many Irish 
specialists spending time in the UK before returning. 
In the case of nurses and midwives, the Committee heard that many Irish nurses and midwives move 
to the UK to work and that Ireland has had challenges in retaining them.151 While the issue of 
incentivising Irish nurses to stay in Ireland is separate to Brexit, the Committee heard that it is 
unlikely that the UK will not recognise qualifications because it needs nurses from abroad. A 
particular point brought to the Committee’s attention was that, in the case of doctors, the situation 
is very much the reverse, with 8% of the UK’s workforce coming from other EU Member States, 
rising to 15% for some disciplines. 
Regarding the second main issue, the importance of retaining the mutual recognition of 
qualifications was stressed to the Committee. In May 2017, the Joint Committee on Health 
recommended that this is retained, so as to minimise any possible disruption to health services.152 As 
an additional solution, the Committee heard that practices undertaken by doctors and medical 
professionals aimed at improving standards across Europe, e.g. the European Union of Medical 
Specialists, should be protected. 
Regulation 
Following the UK’s withdrawal from the EU, it is possible that there will be divergence of regulation 
between the UK and the EU, which could disrupt trade and result in additional requirements in 
certification and clearance, including for pharmaceutical and medical devices. The potential 
withdrawal from the UK from agencies such as the European Centre for Disease Prevention and 
Control and the European Medicines Agency, could have implications for the maintenance of 
common standards. 
Particular reference was made to patient safety measures, which the Committee heard, depends on 
the mutual sharing of information across Europe.153 One particular example given was the 
communication of restrictions placed on a doctor’s ability to practise. It is imperative such measures 
are maintained and agreed between the respective authorities post-Brexit. The Committee heard 
that in the cross- border context, the mutual recognition of prescriptions should be maintained. 
European Medicines Agency (EMA) 
A possible opportunity arising from Brexit is that EU agencies based in the UK will have to remain 
within the EU and therefore move. The Government has identified the EMA as one such agency that 
could be accommodated in Ireland, making a number of arguments in favour of its relocation here, 
including its proximity to London, the quality of life in Ireland, the availability of world class talent 
and a dynamic life sciences sector.154 In relation to this issue, the Committee heard that the EMA 
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would have a positive effect on the pharmaceutical industry and medical research.155 The Committee 
also heard that it could have a positive impact on collaboration between Irish and Northern Irish 
universities, as well as new opportunities in areas such as clinical trials. 
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Appendix 2: Terms of Reference 
 
“D’ainneoin aon ní sna Buan 
Orduithe– 
 
(1) mar aitheantas ar na hiarmhairtí 
ionchasacha a thiocfaidh mar thoradh 
ar bhreith na Ríochta Aontaithe 
tarraingt siar as comhaltas an Aontais 
Eorpaigh, go ndéantar Coiste 
Speisialta, ar a dtabharfar Roghchoiste 
Speisialta an tSeanaid um an Ríocht 
Aontaithe do Tharraingt siar as an 
Aontas Eorpach (‘an Coiste’) a 
cheapadh chun impleachtaí na 
tarraingthe siar sin i leith na hÉireann 
a bhreithniú, ag tagairt go háirithe do 
na nithe seo a leanas: 
 
(a) na himpleachtaí do 
gheilleagar na hÉireann ag 
cásanna imeachta chrua nó 
imeachta bhoig, 
 
(b) an caidreamh idir an Stát 
agus Tuaisceart Éireann, 
 
(c) cearta saoránachta phobal 
uile Thuaisceart Éireann, 
 
(d) an Comhlimistéar Taistil 
agus an Teorainn: gluaiseacht 
earraí, seirbhísí agus daoine 
idir an Stát agus Tuaisceart 
Éireann agus idir Éire agus 
An Bhreatain Mhór, 
 
(e) talmhaíocht agus iascach, 
 
(f) iompar, fuinneamh agus 
cumarsáid, 
 
(g) leas, sláinte agus oideachas, 
agus do cibé nithe gaolmhara eile a 
chinnfidh an Comhchoiste. 
 
(h) todhchaí na hEorpa 
 
(2) Deichniúr comhalta a bheidh ar an 
gCoiste, ar comhalta amháin díobh An 
Seanadóir Neale Richmond a bheidh 
  
That, not withstanding anything in Standing 
Orders- 
 
(1) In recognition of the potential 
consequences of the decision of the 
United Kingdom to withdraw from 
membership of the European Union, a 
special committee, which shall be 
called the Seanad Special Select 
Committee on the Withdrawal of the 
United Kingdom from the European 
Union (‘the Committee’), be appointed 
to consider the implications for Ireland 
of such withdrawal, with particular 
reference to the following matters: 
 
 
(a) the implications for the Irish 
economy of hard and soft exit 
scenarios, 
 
 
(b) relations between the State and 
Northern Ireland, 
 
(c) the citizenship rights of all the 
people of Northern Ireland, 
 
(d) the Common Travel Area and the 
Border: movement of goods, 
services and people between the 
State and Northern Ireland and 
between Ireland and Great Britain, 
 
 
(e) agriculture and fisheries, 
 
(f) transport, energy and 
communications, 
 
(g) welfare, health and education, 
and to such other related matters as 
the Committee may determine. 
 
(h) the future of the EU 
 
(2) The Committee shall consist of ten 
members, of whom one shall be 
Senator Neale Richmond who shall be 
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ina Chathaoirleach/ina Cathaoirleach 
agus a mbeidh naonúr díobh ainmnithe 
ag an gCoiste Roghnóireachta mar a 
leanas: 
 
Grúpa Fhine Gael 2 chomhalta, 
Grúpa Fhianna Fáil 2 chomhalta, 
An Grúpa Neamhspleách 2 chomhalta, 
Grúpa Shinn Féin 1 chomhalta, 
An Grúpa Comhpháirteachais 
Phoiblí 1 chomhalta, 
Grúpa Pháirtí an Lucht 
Oibre 1 chomhalta. 
 
(3) Cúig is córam don Choiste. 
 
 
(4) Beidh ag an gCoiste na cumhachtaí a 
mhínítear i mBuan-Ordú 71 seachas 
míreanna (2A), (3), (4), (4A), (4B), 
(6), (6A), (6B) agus (6C) de. 
 
(5) Ní bheidh feidhm ag míreanna (2) go 
(6), go huile, de Bhuan-Ordú 76 
maidir leis an gCoiste. 
 
(6) Ní bheidh feidhm ag mír (2) de 
Bhuan-Ordú 83 maidir leis an gCoiste. 
 
(7) Déanfaidh an Coiste tuarascáil deiridh a 
thabhairt do Sheanad Éireann nach déanaí 
ná 30 Meitheamh, 2017. 
Chairman, and of whom nine shall be 
nominated by the Committee of 
Selection as follows: 
 
 
Fine Gael group 2 members, 
Fianna Fáil group 2 members, 
Independent group 2 members, 
Sinn Féin group 1 member, 
Civil Engagement group 1 member, 
Labour group 1 member. 
 
 
 
(3) The quorum of the Committee shall be 
five. 
 
(4) The Committee shall have the powers 
defined in Standing Order 71, other 
than paragraphs (2A), (3), (4), (4A), 
(4B), (6), (6A), (6B) and (6C) thereof. 
 
(5) Paragraphs (2) to (6) inclusive of 
Standing Order 76 shall not apply to 
the Committee. 
 
(6) Paragraph (2) of Standing Order 83 
shall not apply to the Committee. 
 
(7) The Committee shall make a final 
report to Seanad Éireann not later than 
30th June, 2017.” 
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Appendix 3: Glossary of Terms 
AFCO European Parliament’s Committee on Constitutional Affairs  
BDO Binder Dijker Otte  
BIIC British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference  
CBI Central Bank of Ireland 
CSO Central Statistics Office 
CEO Chief Executive Officer 
CAP Common Agricultural Policy 
CTA Common Travel Area 
CETA Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement 
CBI (UK) Confederation of British Industry 
DSP Department of Social Protection 
Dr Doctor 
DART Dublin Area Rapid Transport 
ESRI Economic and Social Research Institute 
ETBI Education and Training Boards Ireland  
EI Enterprise Ireland 
ECHR European Convention of Human Rights 
EEA European Economic Area 
EEC European Economic Community 
EIB European Investment Bank 
EMA European Medicines Agency 
EU European Union 
FDI Foreign Direct Investment 
GW Gigawatt 
GPS Global Positioning System 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
HGV Heavy Goods Vehicle 
ICMSA Irish Creamery and Milk Suppliers Association 
ICTU Irish Congress of Trade Unions 
IDA Industrial Development Authority 
IIEA Institute of International and European Affairs 
ISEM Integrated - Single Electricity Market 
IFA Irish Farmers’ Association 
IMO Irish Medical Organisation 
INOU Irish National Organisation of the Unemployed  
ITBA Irish Thoroughbred Breeders’ Association 
JCFPERT Joint Committee on Finance, Public Expenditure and Reform, and Taoiseach 
LGV Light Goods Vehicle 
LOLO Load on, Load off 
MP Member of Parliament 
NUI National University of Ireland 
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development  
PSNI Police Service of Northern Ireland 
RORO Roll-on, Roll-off 
SSSC Seanad Special Select Committee 
SC Senior Counsel 
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SEM Single Electricity Market 
SEUPB Special EU Programmes Body 
S.I. Statutory Instrument 
SONI Electricity system operator for Northern Ireland 
SUSI Student Universal Support Ireland 
TEN-T Trans-European Transport Network  
TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
TCD Trinity College Dublin 
TUC Trades Union Congress 
UK United Kingdom 
US United States of America 
UCC University College Cork 
UREGNI Utility Regulator Northern Ireland 
WTO World Trade Organisation 
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